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INVINCIBLE STANDARD.

Those persons, who, from motives too evident to need exposure, reproached me for having made the taking of this Standard a subject of public discussion, will, undoubtedly lament to see that discussion revived, just when they began to conceive hopes, that their numerous misrepresentations and falsehoods had so confused and bewildered the public mind, as to afford them a *chance*, at least, of seeing the question sink for ever out of sight, covered with contradiction, doubt, and uncertainty. But, the anonymous partizans of the Sinclairs and the 42d Regiment, will, I trust be found to have formed an erroneous judgment of the perseverance of him, with whom they have chosen to contend, and against whom they have, through the innumerable prostituted channels, with which the British press has supplied them, poured forth torrents of the foulest and most infamous calumny. Not in my cause, however, but in the cause which I first espoused, the cause of truth, of justice, and of honour, have I resumed the pen, with a perfect assurance that no apology for so doing will be thought necessary by any person whose good opinion I wish to preserve.

It will be recollected, that, in the Register, Vol. III. p. 164, I published a statement, signed by Lieutenant-Colonels A. STEWART and JAMES STIRLING, Field Officers of the 42d, or Highland Regiment. This statement was first published in the St. James's Chronicle of the 5th of February last; and, in the same print, of the 8th of February, there appeared a string of remarks obviously intended to elucidate, amplify, and apply the facts of the official statement. This statement of the 42d Regiment, thus amplified and explained, having reached the Queen's German Regiment, the officers of that corps have thought it their duty to publish a brief account of its movements on the 21st of March, which account completely overturns the only inference, of any importance, which has been drawn, or which can be drawn, from the statement of Colonels Stewart and Stirling. But, before I submit this document to the reader, it seems necessary to take a cursory view of the circumstances as well as the publications by which it has been preceded.

From the hour that the news of the battle of Alexandria arrived, great pains were taken, by the London news-editors, to inculcate a belief, that the 42d, or Royal Highland Regiment, were entitled to almost the exclusive honour of the victory; and, for several months, there appeared to be no doubt, that the Invincible Standard was taken by that corps. On the 25th of February, 1802, there appeared in the True Briton, a newspaper belonging to a Scotch Man, named Heriott, an account of the proceedings at a meeting of the Highland Society, which meeting had been attended by a considerable number of Scottish noblemen and gentlemen. This account, which was published by authority of the Highland Society, or, at least by a member of that body, tended to confirm the opinion, that the Highlanders alone gained the battle. A serjeant of that regiment, named SINCLAIR, who was introduced to the Society by SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, gave a narrative of the occurrences of the battle of Alexandria, which narrative, it was expressly stated, was given for the sole purpose of *proving* the fact as to the 42d Regiment having taken the Invincible Standard. The serjeant was, by the account here mentioned, said to have stated, that the standard was taken from the French officer by Major Stirling of the 42d:—but the very words of the account will be best here.—"Major Stirling, "followed by Serjeant Sinclair, went up to "the French officer, bearing the Invincible "Standard, and desired him instantly to "deliver it up with his sword. On his re"fusal the Major struck him across the "head with the flat of his sword, and "snatching the Standard forcibly from "him*." It is then stated, that the serjeant received the Standard from Major Stirling, with an order "*to take care of it*;" but that, being afterwards "*cut down*" by the French cavalry, he lost it; and, after

* See the whole proceedings, Register, Vol. II. p. 803.

having got up from the place where he was cut down, he found a musquet, fired *fifteen rounds* with it, and took *six French dismounted horsemen prisoners!!!!!* "While "conducting in these prisoners, he per- "ceived *a soldier of General Stuart's corps*" [the Queen's German Regiment], "*carry- "ing into the rear the* INVINCIBLE STAN- "DARD, *which he had* PICKED UP, *while "the Serjeant lay as already described.*" That is to say, according to his own words, "in "a state of *insensibility*." How a man could, while he himself was in a state of *insensibility*, know and see what was passing by his side, neither the Serjeant nor his historians thought proper to explain. The fact is, that, previous to the meeting of the Highland Society, the true story had partially got abroad; people had said, that it was a soldier of the German Regiment who took the Standard which was *brought home*, in proof of which divers public orders and certificates were appealed to, and, as there was but *one* Standard brought home, it was necessary for those who were resolved that nobody but the Highlanders should have the honour of taking it, to find out some way or other of making the world believe, that, though the Standard was *brought in to head quarters by* ANTHONY LUTZ, a soldier of the German Regiment, yet that the said LUTZ did not take it from the enemy, but PICKED IT UP, that is to say, *found it*, or *stole it* from the 42d Regiment. Hence the story of Serjeant Sinclair, or of the Highland Society; for I pretend not to say which of them had the honour of inventing it.

The matter remained very quiet 'till the month of December last. The Highland Society were preparing *a medal* to immortalize the achievement; a cup of great value was ordered to be made, as a present to the 42d Regiment, ornamented with appropriate devices, one of which was, *a Highlander taking the Standard*—Ker Porter's Panorama, the Print-shops, the Play-houses, the Circus, Sadler's-wells, with almost every other place of exhibition or amusement, lent their most powerful aid; while the Scotch newspaper editors, of whom London has to boast of no scanty provision, bent the whole force of their "infernal machines" against every gleam of truth that threatened hostility to the deception. Notwithstanding, however, the watchfulness of these numerous and zealous supporters, means were silently preparing for wresting the laurel from the brow of the Highlanders, and restoring it to its rightful owners. I had, during the summer, discovered the real state of the case; and, when the proper time came, I published my Narrative, which, with all its interesting documents, will be found in the Register, Vol. II. p. 801. The taking of the Standard by LUTZ was thus made out. 1. LUTZ, who was sent for to London, wore (and still wears) upon the breast of his coat, a representation of the Invincible Standard. 2. This badge is worn in consequence of a public order, issued by General Stuart, on the 4th of April, 1801, as a mark of honour conferred on him for having "*taken* the standard FROM THE "ENEMY, in the battle of the 21st of "March." 3. That this badge of honour was not given without just pretensions, is proved by the certificate of the Assistant Adjutant-General, which proves the bringing in of the Standard to head-quarters by LUTZ, and which states, that LUTZ "*took* "the said Standard FROM THE ENE- "MY." 4. I next relate the evidence of Lieutenant MONCRIEFF, of the Queen's German Regiment, to whom LUTZ first presented the Standard, when he brought it to the ranks of his regiment, in the heat of the battle. 5. The proof is closed and completed by the evidence (taken upon oath) of Corporal Schmid and Private Wohlwend, who state, that they saw the Standard in the hands of the flying enemy, that they saw LUTZ fire at the person who carried it, that they saw him rush into the smoke after his fire, and return again, almost immediately, with the Standard in his hand *.—Thus the Standard was traced from the hands of the enemy to those of the English Commander in Chief; and thus was it clearly and incontestibly proved, that this symbol of victory was taken, carried in, and delivered at head-quarters by LUTZ, and by nobody but LUTZ.

Now, what has been produced in opposition to this proof? Much declamation, much calumny; but no evidence, and no argument. My Narrative with its accompanying documents were published on the 25th of December; a "*complete refutation*" was instantly promised by the Scotch editors; day after day this promise was renewed, always accompanied with most violent abuse on me and on my poor friend LUTZ, who might, we would think, have been spared, were it only for his having had the presence of mind to "*pick up*" and to *keep* the famous standard. † At last, after six weeks consideration, out came the "Narrative, by authority," of the Field Officers of the 42d regiment, signed by A. STEW-

* See all these documents, Register, Vol. II. p. 814, 815, and 816.

† See Vol. II. p. 868 to 870.

ART and JAMES STIRLING, Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels. This Narrative, which will be found at full length in page 164 of Vol. III. of the Register, says nothing, *positively*, to invalidate the claim of LUTZ, but, on the contrary, it does, as far as negative evidence can go, establish and confirm the justice of that claim. "The "42d regiment," say the narrators, "it "this time, closed in with them" [the enemy], "and *their standard* was taken from "the bearer by Major Stirling, who con- "signed it in charge to a non-commissioned "officer."—"The non-commissioned offi- "cer (Serjeant Sinclair) to whom *the stand- "ard* was given in charge, was wounded "in the *rear* of the regiment, and *by him the "standard was* LOST!" This is all. Here is nothing controversial; but the simple statement of two facts; to wit, that Major Stirling took a standard, and that Serjeant Sinclair lost it again. Facts, which, as I said before, I have never called in question, and which I have not the least inclination to deny. Repeating what I said, at the time when this "Narrative by authority" was published, I shall here just point out the disagreement between the narrative of Serjeant Sinclair, as published by the Highland Society, and that which Colonels Stewart and Stirling submitted to the public,—Serjeant Sinclair said (or was made to say), that the standard which Major Stirling took, was the *Invincible* Standard. The Narrative, signed by the field officers, affixes to it no such epithet. Colonels Stewart and Stirling do, indeed, refrain from stating, that the standard, taken by the 42d regiment, was *not* the Invincible Standard; and, though Major Stirling himself took it, it is possible, that, at the time of drawing up the narrative, he might not *recollect*, or might never have been able to distinguish, whether it was, or was not, the Invincible Standard finally brought to England; but if Major STIRLING was not, from want of recollection, or from whatever other cause, able to say, that the standard he took was *not* the Invincible Standard, it inevitably follows, that he was not, and that he is not, able to say that it *was* the Invincible Standard.—Then again, Serjeant Sinclair asserted (or he was made to assert), that the standard, committed to his charge, was "PICKED UP," by his side, "while he lay in a state of *insensibility*." But, Colonels STEWART and STIRLING say nothing about the standard's being *picked up* from the side of the serjeant. They say he *lost* it, and that is all. The circumstance of *picking up*, was the most material of his whole narrative, as its evident tendency was to rob LUTZ and his regiment of the honour of having taken the standard *from the enemy*. This circumstance was dropped in the narrative, though be it observed, Serjeant Sinclair must, of course, *have been examined, previous to the drawing up of the regimental statement*.—Thus it appears, then, that, according to the narrative, there was not only no ground for stating that LUTZ *picked up* and brought in a standard, which was the prize of the 42d regiment, but that Colonels Stewart and Stirling were quite uncertain whether the standard brought in by LUTZ was the same standard that was lost by Sinclair. That there is, in England, but *one* French standard, which was taken in the battle of Alexandria, is well known; it is equally well known, that that standard was taken from the enemy by LUTZ; and, all that is made appear by the narrative, is, that the 42d regiment themselves do not know, that they ever had this standard, even for one moment, in their possession, though the justly indignant Public will not fail to recollect, that it was openly proposed, by the Scotch editors in London, to send it to be kept in the city of *Edinburgh!*

But, though Colonels Stewart and Stirling *said* nothing, *positively*, to weaken the claim of LUTZ and the Queen's German Regiment, their narrative was, by the supporters of the claim of the 42d regiment, made to *infer* a destruction of that claim altogether! And, here, it is necessary to show the *connexion* between the "Narrative by Authority" and the remarks thereon. The narrative appeared in the St. James's Chronicle of 5th of February, the remarks in the next number of the *same paper*. That *both came from Edinburgh* there is sufficient internal evidence; and, as it was absolutely impossible, that the St. James's Chronicle of the 5th of February could have reached that city time enough to enable the writer of the remarks to send them to London for publication on the 8th of February, it follows, of course, that he must, at least, have *seen* the narrative previous to its appearance in print.—The part of Colonels Stewart and Stirling's narrative, from which an inference has been drawn unfavourable to the claim of LUTZ and the German Regiment, is as follows:—"Or- "ders were at that moment given by Lt. "Col. A. Stewart to charge, which was "instantly done, and the French infan- "try were driven down the declivity to a "considerable distance in front, and left "of the position of the reserve. They re- "treated through the intervals of their "cavalry, who were now observed, as the "smoak cleared away, close to the left of

" the 42d.—The exertions of this charge " had disordered the line, and Lt. Col. A. " Stewart judging that the enemy's ca- " valry were preparing to charge in turn, " ordered the 42d to form quickly on the " grenadiers and prepare to receive them. " This moment was selected by the enemy " for a desperate charge. It was doubt- " less a moment in which a regiment, " pressing close on a retreating enemy, " cannot be supposed to be correctly in " line. The charge of the cavalry was " made *en masse*, and in some places pene- " trated the intervals which had been oc- " casioned by the movements to form on " the grenadiers, an order which in the " continued fire of musquetry could not " be distinctly heard by the whole batta- " lion. The right were protected by the " fire of the 28th on the redoubt, and " *Brigadier General Stewart bringing up his* " *brigade* AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT, " his own regiment gave the enemy a close " and well-directed fire, which allowed " time to the 42d to join their efforts to " those of the rest of the reserve, and of " the foreign brigade, in *repelling the cavalry*. " This service was speedily accomplished " with the effect stated in the dispatches " of the commander in chief. The rest of " the action consisted in sharp shooting " and cannonading as stated in the same " dispatches." —The inference drawn from this statement (in the remarks above alluded to) is as follows:—" From this nar- " rative it *distinctly appears*, that one bat- " talion of the French infantry were de- " feated by the 42d regiment; that their " standard was taken by Major Stirling " with his own hands, and consigned by " him in charge to Serjeant Sinclair; that " the 42d regiment afterwards engaged " the other columns of the French infan- " try, successively defeated them, and " forced them to seek shelter among their " cavalry; that the cavalry then made a " desperate charge *en masse* on the 42d " regiment, and yet were able to penetrate " it only in the intervals left between the " different bodies of that corps in forming " to receive the charge; that all this was " done *before the Queen's German Regiment* " *came into action*; that the first fire from " the latter corps was after the 42d had " received the desperate charge of the ca- " valry; that consequently THE GER- " MAN REGIMENT HAD NEVER " BEEN ENGAGED WITH THE " FRENCH INFANTRY." * — Thus, then, according to this writer, according to the supporter of the 42d regiment, it " dis- " tinctly appears, from their narrative," that the French infantry corps, engaged in that part of the field, were all successively defeated, " *before* the Queen's German Re- " giment *came into action*," that the *first* fire from that corps was even " *after* the " 42d regiment had received the des- " perate charge of the *cavalry*," and that the German Regiment " *had* NEVER *been* " *engaged with the French* INFANTRY," the object of all which is to show, that the claim of LUTZ and his regiment is totally unfounded; because, if that regiment was never engaged with *infantry*, they could not take the Invincible Standard *from the enemy*, that standard being an *infantry* standard.—This brings us to the statement of the officers of the Queen's German Regiment.

" *Queen's German Regiment.—Cork, 15th* " *March*, 1803.

" Before we trespass on the attention of " the Public, we beg leave to premise, that, " however repeatedly we may have been " the subject of discussion, it never was our " wish so to be, much less was it, either di- " rectly or indirectly, our request; and, " that, it is with a degree of reluctance to be " overcome only by a sense of *duty* to our " corps, that we now trouble the public " with a short statement of facts, for the " purpose of removing an error circulated " through the St. James's Chronicle of the " 8th of February last.

" With this motive it is, that we, the un- " dersigned field-officers of the regiment, " at the express desire of the corps, declare, " that the Queen's German regiment was, " on the 21st of March, 1801, in column, " when the alarm, on the right of the Bri- " tish line was given, and that our move- " ment, particularly that of the left wing, " which was ordered to support the reserve, " was as prompt as the immediate power " of formation from column into line could " admit of; so that we arrived, not only " most critically in time to assist in repul- " sing the French CAVALRY, but like- " wise to unite our efforts with those of " that part of the British army that day en- " gaged, in *receiving*, *resisting*, and *repulsing*, " the French line of INFANTRY. In " proof of this, we have to state, that " Lieutenants DEJEAN, and DU VERGIER, " with many men, were killed, and that " Captains MAHONY, and RICHARDSON, " Lieutenants MAC CARTHY, SUTTON, " LANG, and ZEHUEDER, Adjutant OFFER- " MAN, together with a number of non- " commissioned officers and privates, were " wounded, *prior to the charge of the French* " *cavalry*. During that charge, Lieutenant

* St. James's Chronicle, Feb. 8, 1803.

" Colonel DU TENS, who had been pre-
" viously wounded by a musket ball, fell by
" the stroke of a sabre. Captain MISSETT,
" Lieutenant HUTTON, and seventy two
" rank and file were also wounded by the
" sabre. The number of non-commissioned
" officers and privates killed and wounded
" by the musquetry is, as near as possible,
" 148. Wounded by the cavalry, and now
" present with the regiment, 72. Of com-
" missioned officers there were 14 killed
" and wounded. Total killed and wound-
" ed, 234.

" We do not state these facts for the pur-
" pose of arrogating to ourselves more me-
" rit than is due to every other corps en-
" gaged. We ask only for an equal por-
" tion, and that not at the hands of any par-
" ticular regiment.

" (Signed) JAMES LYON, Lieut. Colonel.
" CHARLES GORMOCAN, Major."

This statement, then, a statement which I venture to assert will never be contradicted by any one who, if he has a *name*, will put that name to what he writes; this statement completely does away the last poor pitiful subterfuge of the Sinclairs and their partizans. Here is nothing said about the *standard:* it was not necessary: the official documents; the general, the brigade, the regimental orders and proceedings were already before the public: the field officers of the 42d had *not*, in their narrative, *put in any positive claim to the Standard that was brought home*; but, they had published something, from which their own partizans inferred, and proclaimed to the world, that the Queen's German regiment was not, in the battle of Alexandria, " ever engaged with *infantry*:" indeed, this seems to be an inference fairly drawn from the statement of the 42d regiment, and to this inference, the Queen's German regiment have here given a clear and *positive contradiction*. Let the writer of the remarks no longer say, then, " that the charge of *falsehood* now lies " between Mr. Cobbett on the one side, and " the officers of the 42d regiment on the " other, and that the public have to choose " which of *these two* they will believe;" for, though, were it on any point coming within my own knowledge, I should have no objection to let my word stand its chance against that of the whole corps of the 42d regiment, the public will, at once, perceive, that the charge of *falsehood* now lies, not between *me* and the officers of the 42d regiment, but between the narrative of those officers (as explained and inferred from by their partizans,) and that of the officers of the Queen's German regiment; and, I am very much deceived, if the public will hesitate one single moment in making their choice. The narrative of the 42d regiment has been drawn up with more than diplomatic precaution. It can hardly be said to affirm, or to deny, any thing. It does not say that Major Stirling *did* take the Invincible Standard, neither does it say that he did *not* take it: it does not say that the standard was *picked up*, neither does it say that it was *not* picked up: it does not say that the regiment was, according to Sir Robert Wilson's account, *broken and overwhelmed*, neither does it say that it was *not* broken and overwhelmed: it leaves every thing to inference, and, with characteristic propriety, secures a retreat in every direction. With respect to the Queen's German regiment never being engaged with *infantry*, however, the inference is somewhat too plain. The narrative makes the 42d regiment repulse the infantry, body after body, and, when the battle is *quite over* with the infantry, it introduces the Queen's German regiment to assist in repulsing the cavalry. In short, it is impossible that any person, unacquainted with the true history of the engagement, should not believe, from reading this narrative, that the German regiment never was, at any one time, engaged with the French infantry. This is too, the meaning attached to the narrative by the supporters of the 42d regiment; and it is to this part of the narrative, conveying this meaning, that the officers of the Queen's German Regiment have now given a *contradiction* not guarded by equivocal terms and ambiguous phrases, but clearly and positively expressed, and supported by a detail of killed and wounded. " We *were* " engaged with infantry," say they, " and " the proof that we were so engaged is, " we had 2 officers killed and 7 wounded, " and 148 non-commissioned officers and " privates killed and wounded *by that infan-* " *try*."—This assertion, then, the field officers of the 42d regiment must disprove, or they must disclaim the meaning, which their partizans have attached to their own narrative, and which meaning has been circulated through the very same vehicle chosen by them for the publication of that narrative. That their narrative, thus construed, tends to rob another corps of its due share of honour, is evident, and, indeed, is now so declared by the officers of that other corps: if, therefore, their narrative has, by their own partisans, been *misconstrued*, let them disavow the construction; if it has *not* been misconstrued, let them refute the statement of the officers of the Queen's German Regiment.

As to the standard, I mean the

standard, which was brought to England, and which is to be placed on the tomb of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, it must now be evident to every man, that it was taken *from the enemy* by LUTZ; and, it only remains for me to show the utter improbability, not to say impossibility, of its ever having, even for a single moment, been in the hands of the 42d regiment.—Major Stirling, who took the standard which Sinclair lost, states, and certifies under his own hand, that Sinclair went into the *rear* with that standard, and both he and Sinclair agree in stating, that it was in the *rear* that Sinclair lost it. But, the narrative of LUTZ, confirmed by the word of honour of Lieutenant MONCRIEFF, and by the oaths of SCHMID and WOHLWEND, prove, that the standard which we now have, was taken from the enemy in the *front* and not in the rear. As to time, too, the facts make directly against the supposition of pre-occupancy by the 42d regiment. Sinclair lost his standard *after* the attack of the cavalry began; but our standard was taken *before* that attack began, and that too from a corps of infantry, which the German Regiment had repulsed and was in pursuit of. The whole of the evidence, therefore, of LUTZ, of Lieutenant MONCRIEFF, of SCHMID, and of WOHLWEND, must be completely overset by *positive proof*, nothing like which has yet been attempted to be advanced, before there can be the slightest foundation, whereon to build the claim of pre-occupancy.—How Sir Robert Wilson has been able to satisfy himself, that the Invincible Standard was, as is stated in the second edition of his work, "*first* taken by the 42d regiment, then lost, and afterwards retaken by LUTZ," I am totally at a loss to account for upon any other supposition than that he must still have laboured under the same sort of error, which led to the statement in his first edition, where he says:—"In "this battle the French Standard was "taken. Serjeant Sinclair of the 42d re- "giment, and a private of the Minorca, "whose name, unfortunately, cannot now "be acquired, claimed equally the trophy, "and it appears, that each merited the "honour. Serjeant Sinclair first *took* it, but "being ordered *forwards* by an officer, he "gave it to a *private*, who was *killed*. "When the Minorca advanced the French "had *recovered* the colours, but the private "wrested them from the man who had pos- "session, and then bayonetted him."—Now, let us see, how this agrees with the statement of the parties concerned?

SIR ROBERT says,	M. STIRLING and S. SINCLAIR says,
That the standard was taken by the *Serjeant*.	That the standard was taken by the *Major*.
That the Serjeant was ordered *forwards*.	That the Serjeant was ordered *backwards*.
That the Serjeant gave the standard to a *private*.	That the Major gave the standard to the *Serjeant*.
That the private who had the care of the standard, was *killed*.	That the Serjeant, who had the care of the standard, is *now alive*.
That the standard was *recovered by the French*.	That the Serjeant lost the standard, and that LUTZ *picked it up by his side*.

Captain WALSH, in his Journal of the late Campaign in Egypt gives what we regard as a statement perfectly correct:—"A stan- "dard," says he, page 101, "covered with "the military exploits of the corps to which "it belonged (according to General Reg- "nier, a battalion of the 21st demi-brigade), "fell into the hands of the Queen's German "Regiment. It was *taken* by a private, named "ANTHONY LUTZ, for which he received "a certificate from the Adjutant-General, "and the sum of twenty dollars. In the "early part of the action, a standard had "been wrested from the French by the "42d regiment, which was, however, un- "fortunately, *retaken from them.*"——This strictly agrees with the evidence produced; for it is childish to suppose, that the standard, taken by the 42d was "*lost*" by any other means than that of *re-capture*. The Serjeant and his officers say that he was wounded; he himself says he was cut down by a body of the enemy; and, can any one suppose, that that same body, who cut him down, would fail to take up the standard that he had in his hand? Besides, if they had not so taken it, it would have remained on the field, on the ground of the 42d regiment, and then comes the question, which never can be satisfactorily answered, *where is it now?*

Having now refuted every objection that has, at any time, been urged against my former statements on this subject; having fixed, upon immutable foundations, the claim of LUTZ to the *taking* of the Invincible Standard, I have only to add a few observations respecting the *merit* of that achievement, and the *reward* which it ought to have met with.

Since it has been discovered, or rather, since the public has been informed, that the standard was taken by a *French*, and not by a *Scotch* man, considerable pains have been taken to represent, in an underhand way, the *manner of the capture* as exhibiting no very striking marks of personal courage, and even to decry the *value* of the prize it-

self. The Scotch editor, Heriot, who was put in possession of the True Briton by Mr. George Rose, formerly Secretary of the Treasury, now speaks of the Standard, as of "what *has been called* the INVINCIBLE *Standard*;" and, the Edinburgh and Glasgow commentators, anticipating the final award of the public, have, even while endeavouring to support the claim of the 42d regiment, *candidly* acknowledged, that "the *thing* claimed was of no very great importance!!!"—The manner and circumstances of the capture exhibit, perhaps, as striking proofs of good soldiership and of personal courage as ever were exhibited on any occasion. It has been stated, by one base traducer, in an Edinburgh paper, that "it" [the capture of the standard] "was no *vo-*" *luntary* act on the part of LUTZ; that he "was *led*, or, if you please, *forced*, on by his "regiment: and the colour happened to "*fall* into his hands." So that, LUTZ was *forced* on by his regiment, the regiment was *forced* on by the brigade, the brigdade was *forced* on by the army, and the army was *forced* on by the Commander in Chief; and thus the Invincible Standard comes back to Scotland again! But, unfortunately, this ingenious mode of reasoning does not apply to the present case; for, LUTZ did not take the standard while he was in the ranks. It has been proved upon oath, that he had pushed *voluntarily* on, far beyond the ranks of his regiment, in pursuit of the enemy; that he advanced further than the boldest of his comrades; that he *alone* approached close to the rear of the fleeing French, and that he, in consequence thereof, in consequence of his own personal valour, obtained possession of the Standard. When he had got it, too, he did not *lose* it. Though, in his way back to his corps, he was attacked by two horsemen, he did not, in order to save himself, surrender his trophy, but, on the contrary, resisted and overcame the assailants, one of whom he led prisoner to the regiment. In short, the great and imminent dangers, with which he was surrounded, the courage and the presence of mind which he discovered, and the dexterity with which he executed every part of his enterprize, places his name amongst those of the bravest of the brave. *

As to the *value* of the standard, looking merely at the staff and the tattered silk, of which it is composed, I must, indeed, acknowledge, with the *candid* Scotch editors, that "the *thing* claimed is of no very great "importance." I dare say it would not, exclusively of the silver tassels, sell at rag-fair for above six pence, or seven pence at most; and, as it cost us twenty dollars, we made, in this respect, rather a bad bargain. But, taking it in a military and national point of view, the Highland Society, the Parliament, and his Majesty himself, have furnished us with a tolerable criterion whereby to judge of its value and its importance. By the former, a *medal* was to be struck to commemorate the valour shown by the 42d regiment, in the battle of Alexandria, which medal was to bear on it the Invincible Standard as a trophy won by that valour. The same society, agreeably to the propositions of several noblemen and gentlemen of great distinction, resolved to cause to be made a costly cup, to be presented to the mess of the 42d regiment; and this cup, which was to amount to a hundred guineas, at least, was to have, amongst its "appropriate devices" the representation of a Highlander in the act of taking the standard, that very standard, which the partizans of the 42d regiment *now* tell us, is "*a thing of no very* "*great importance!*"—But, there is still a higher authority whereunto to appeal: that of the Parliament, and of his Majesty himself. On the 18th of May, 1801, the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward a motion for erecting, at the public expense, a monument, in the Cathedral of St. Paul, to the memory of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, who was commander in chief at the battle of Alexandria, and who lost his life, in consequence of a wound he received in that battle. On the 20th of May, his Majesty sent a message to Parliament, signifying his intention to bestow on Lady Abercrombie the dignity of a Barony of Great Britain, with remainder to the heirs male of Sir Ralph, together with an annual pension of 2000*l.* to descend to the two next succeeding heirs, this pension to be accounted to commence from the day on which the battle of Alexandria was fought. In what degree the *standard* was connected with all this, what value his Majesty and the Parliament attached to that trophy, which the Scotch editors *now* tell us, "is a *thing of no very great* "*importance*," will appear from the following extract of Mr. Addington's speech:—"I am inclined to rate Sir Ralph Aber-"crombie among the first military charac-"ters that ever adorned the country. His "end bore a striking resemblance to that "of General Wolfe. I will only add, that "his Majesty, with that gracious disposi-"tion which he has ever manifested to do "honour to those who have served him "faithfully, and by their exertions, have "benefitted the country, has directed that

* See the interesting particulars, in Register, Vol. II. p. 801 *et seq.* or in the number sold separately.

" THE STANDARD, which has *fallen into* " *our power*, [not that which was *lost*] " should *adorn the monument to be erected to* " *Sir Ralph Abercrombie, to preserve the me-* " *mory of his services.* It is a striking cir- " cumstance, that THIS STANDARD *will* " *remain to the latest posterity, at least as long* " *as a fragment of it can be preserved, as a* " *testimony of the bravery of a man, who never* " *drew his sword to subvert and destroy, but to* " *save as well as to conquer.*—.....The " conquerors of Italy fled before our army, " and THEIR STANDARD remained *the* " *prize of the victors:* ENGLISHMEN *will* " *weep when they shall behold it; it is a prize* " *that has cost us dear.* TO OBTAIN IT, " *we have lost our brave general.*"—And was this standard, then, " a thing of no very great " importance?" Or has it lost that importance since the 18th of May, 1801; since it has been discovered not to have been taken by the 42d regiment? And will it not now be placed upon the tomb? Is it possible, that the Scotch or English nation will relinquish this honour; is it possible that they will burn the standard, rather than do justice to LUTZ? Will they be inveigled into this act of folly and of baseness, merely to gratify the spleen, arising from disappointed assurance and intrigue?—That the standard should " adorn the monument of " Sir Ralph Abercrombie, to *preserve the me-* " *mory of his services,*" is most just; but, does not justice call also for something to preserve the memory of the deed, by which that standard was obtained? That the standard may " remain, to the latest posterity, as a tes- " timony of *the bravery of Sir Ralph,*" must be the wish of every grateful heart; but, does not national gratitude also demand something, as a testimony of *the bravery of Lutz*, that bravery, to which, and to which alone, we are immediately indebted for this trophy of immortal honour? And will not the servants of that Sovereign, " whose " gracious disposition has ever been mani- " fested *to do honour to those who have served* " *him faithfully, and, by their exertions, have* " *benefited the country*;" will not the servants of that gracious Sovereign counsel him to bestow some small mark of his royal favour on the brave, the faithful, and the zealous captor of that symbol of victory, at the sight of which " *Englishmen will weep*" with exultation; the symbol of that victory, too, on which we justly ground our claims to military valour superior to that of our rival in arms? " It is a prize that *has cost us dear.*" Yes, it has cost us *twenty dollars!* Twenty whole dollars! *Four pounds ten shillings* British sterling! And, shall it be said of Britain, that this was the price she paid for a trophy, of which she is justly proud, and which has been an object of gracious dispensation in the hands of her Sovereign! If this be so, all honourable Englishmen will, indeed, " *weep,*" when they behold the fragments of the Invincible Standard, not with exultation, but with shame; shame and remorse, to reflect, that while this trophy adorns the tomb of our hero and the temple of our God, the gallant LUTZ is left to waste in obscurity and penury, and to end, perhaps, in wretchedness and want, that life, at the hazard of which, this proud and immortal trophy was obtained.

What I have been able to collect, from the sale of the portrait of this gallant and loyal Frenchman, shall hereafter be faithfully accounted for; but, if those whose *duty* it is to bestow on him suitable honour and reward, neglect that duty, he shall not, by my instrumentality, have recourse to *public subscription.* The French, at the battle of Alexandria, previous to their attack on the Foreign Brigade, cried out: " down " with your arms, Germans, we are not " *your* enemies; we'll give you plenty of " *bread!*" Of which it was well known our army had long been greatly in want. " No, no," replied the German Regiment, " we fight for the King of England; you " may keep your bread!"—And, LUTZ shall not, through me at least, in England, have recourse to *mendicant* means, to obtain that bread, which, in her service, and in the field of battle, he refused at the hands of the enemies of England.

As to the part I have taken in this affair, I am certain it will meet with the approbation of all just and honourable men, of whatever nation they may be; and, to those, who are of a contrary description, I scorn to offer any thing that might be construed into an apology. WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Westminster,
March 31, 1803.

THE TREATY OF AMIENS NOT BINDING ON THE COUNTRY.

SIR,—I shall not trouble your readers with a dissertation on the law of nations, on the obligations of treaties, on the circumstances which render them nugatory; on the lawful grounds of war, on the balance of power, &c.—These are points which have long since been settled, and large volumes have been written on these subjects, separately and collectively.—I shall only state a few facts to elucidate the question as it now exists between the contracting parties respecting the treaty of Amiens.

As it appears that Malta is the principal point in dispute at this moment, its impor-

tance ought to be clearly ascertained.—By the length of the article in the treaty which regards this island, it would seem that the evacuation of it by Great Britain was the principal object which France had in view; and the securing its neutrality and independence the only concession required of the First Consul.—We are willing to allow that Malta is of very great importance, and that ministers should not have consented, in November last, to evacuate it. But how comes it to pass, that only four months ago ministers were ignorant of its importance? Did they then not know that the possession of it would secure to us the command of the Mediterranean, as the evacuation of it would give to France the sovereignty of that sea, and exclude us from it for ever? Did they not know that its occupation would give to this country the means of protecting in a great measure Italy, Turkey, and Egypt, which otherwise must lie prostrate at the mercy of France. — Buonaparté seemed anxious to place it in feeble hands.—Our negotiators were satisfied by being promised a guarantee, as if that could save it from the claws of France. Taking it however for granted that Buonaparté had no intention of wresting from the hands of the knights, he still had obtained his object by excluding us from the only port in the Mediterranean, which could be a check on his ambition, and stop the progress of his aggrandizement in those parts.—The necessity that France should occupy Malta, in order to effect all its government has in view, does not appear. She has Elba.—She can command the ports of Sicily,—and probably will, when we have quitted Malta, make a conquest of the whole island, in spite of the knights of the order, and in spite of our ministry.—By the treaty of Amiens, certain possessions, or acquisitions made during the war, were disposed of.—France and Great Britain were placed, thereby, in a positive relative situation, in regard to their respective power or force, or, in other words, a balance of power (whether just or unjust matters not) was understood to have been established.—Had neither of the countries changed their relative situation in other respects, the honour of Great Britain, as well as that of France was concerned in the fulfilling of the treaty of Amiens in every point, and a breach of the treaty would have been a breach of national faith on either part.—It has been a maxim in all ages, and particularly in latter times, where the preservation of the balance of power has been the great subject of wars and treaties, that no state can make acquisitions of any kind, or by any means, so as to derange its antecedent relative situation to other countries; and every acquisition, made without the consent of its neighbours, gives to them a right of interference, and, if things be not restored to their former situation, affords them just grounds for war, and consequently annihilates all treaties.—A greater insult cannot be offered to the British nation than the pretension of Buonaparté, that this country should consider the treaty of Amiens as still existing; nor can a greater proof of the imbecility of ministers be produced than that of admitting his pretension.—In October last, the acquisitions of France since the peace, were become so alarming to the safety of other countries, in whose preservation we have the strongest interest, and to the safety and independence of our own country, that ministers were seriously alarmed. —They determined not to evacuate the possessions that were then in our hands, and in this resolution, it is confidently reported, *they had the firm support of Mr. Pitt—which they lost on altering their conduct.*—Instead of courageously declaring to Buonaparté that the principle was violated, and the treaty of Amiens itself ceased to exist; that consequently, either the war would be renewed, or that another treaty must be formed, which would replace the two countries in a state of the same proportion of relative strength as was established by the treaty of Amiens, (when France had not made the acquisitions complained of.)—Instead of following this manly conduct, which the nation called for, they pusillanimously negotiated, allowing the treaty to be binding to this country, and agreed to cede every thing as his Consular Majesty should be pleased to dictate.—Here occurs a question, which shall be the subject of future discussion; *how far this exercise of the executive power is constitutional.*—In consequence of which Buonaparté, while he was actually subjugating a part of the world, and laying plans for subjugating the remainder, imperiously demanded the immediate fulfilling of the conditions of the treaty; denied that we had any right to interfere in other matters, and was highly offended that we had presumed though in the most humble manner, to ask his Consular Majesty, why he was pleased to do all this?—Instead of having obtained any concession from Buonaparté, by the stand ministers made in October, they evidently ceded more to him. In the treaty it was established that the grand master should be elected at Malta in a general chapter of the order, according to its ancient statutes; but in November they consented that the Pope should name the grand-master, which is actually leaving the choice

to Buonaparté, for the Pope is so totally dependent that he must appoint whom the Consul prefers.

In this present month of March (a year since the *definitive!*—treaty of *peace!* was signed,) ministry have discovered, something they did not see before, nobody knows what—and they won't tell.—It is said, by some of their friends, that they surmise, that the occupying of Louisiana will be attended with direful consequences:—that all South America will fall into the hands of France;—that her power in the West-Indies may be dangerous to Jamaica, and our other islands;—that France will have a great navy;—that she will exclude us from commercial intercourse with all the world. —That she will cause to be ceded to her all the colonies of her allies, by a *consular mediation*.—That she will acquire possession of all Italy;—that by a similar *consular mediation*, Naples and Sicily, will be put under her protection, and the Republic of the Seven Islands be freed from all civil discord, and, to preserve their liberty and independence, will be garrisoned by French troops; —that Candia and some of the Greek islands are to enjoy the blessings of a French government, and become a part of the great republic one and indivisible;—that the Beys of Egypt will be pardoned for their disaffection to the prophet of God, the true believer, the faithful Musselman, and zealous son and protector of the holy Catholic religion.—That Sebastiani's report indicates this and more too.—That his imperial Consular Majesty, has in view to concert measures with his brother his Imperial Czarian Majesty to drive the Ottomans out of Europe, and to divide their country; though they have had some difference on the question of who shall have the Morea.—That Malta is of importance to this country, and that no guarantee, nor all the *heroic exertions* of the knights can save it from France:—that the island of Elba is a most dangerous post:— that France will have great advantages by being sole mistress of the Mediterranean, and that her fleets united with those of her sister *independent* republics, and tributary monarchies, may become an object of alarm. —That intrigues are carried on in Ireland, and the disaffected are encouraged by Napper Tandy and others, and that he is also suffered to be encouraged.—That armaments are preparing to invade either that country, or Great Britain itself, or both; and a long chapter of *et cæteras* besides.

In consequence of ministers having at last taken alarm, or rather been panic-struck, the country is now arming at a great expense, and every one is ready to draw his sword, or untie the strings of his purse.— After all this, is the country to-morrow to be told that the treaty of Amiens is binding to Great Britain, but that by the firmness, wisdom, and magnanimity of ministry, who have dared, (*by a side glance,*) to look Buonaparté in the face, the relations of amity are re-established (*at least for two months,*) and that they have obtained all the satisfaction for the country which they desired; and that, lest we should again offend the Consul, we must not ask a single question about what has passed? No. This country has both the means and the courage to repel every attack.—It will not be insulted by any foreign power on earth; or suffer its honour and dignity to be traduced by any set of men, who may prefer the possession of their offices to the welfare of their country.

In this lamentable state of things, will not those absent men of transcendent talents, who possess the confidence of the nation, and to whom the monied as well as the landed interest look up, incur as much blame as those who hold their places, if they do not stand forward and manfully avow their sentiments in the present momentous crisis? Whatever excuse they may make for their conduct, they cannot deny, that *they were absent from their post in the hour of danger; that they abandoned their country when they might, perhaps, have saved it.*—If they will not come forward, is there no other set of men to be found? Is there no integrity remaining—no talent in this frivolous time of dissipation? Is the genius of Britain sleeping? Or is her genius departed? J. B.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.—The most interesting object, in the affairs of the United States, is the discussion with regard to the navigation of the Mississippi, or rather, at present, the *right of deposit at New Orleans*, of which the Spanish Intendant appears resolved to deprive the Americans. Besides regular files of different news papers, we have lately received two pamphlets from America, on this important topic, which seems to have absorbed the whole attention of the people of that country. One of the pamphlets contains the translation of a Memoir, said to have been presented, a little while previous to the peace of Amiens, to the chief Consul of France; which Memoir exposes most amply the ambitious, not to say hostile, views of the French, with regard to the North American continent, and which has, of course, added not a little to the apprehensions already excited in the minds of the people of the United States.—The Intendant of New Orleans had, in the mean time, rigorously adhered to the terms of his

proclamation *. Great quantities of American produce, brought down the Mississippi in slight built boats, had arrived at New Orleans, and a considerable portion of it had been lost in the river, in consequence of their being no place to deposit it. One boat, loaded with cotton, had, by accident, been sunk in the river. The cotton was taken up, and landed on one of the wharfs, until it could be put on board an American ship; but, the Intendant on hearing thereof, ordered it to be instantly removed, on pain of its being thrown into the dock. But, the tenor of the Royal Order of Spain for the surrender of Louisiana to France, has created, amongst the Americans, more resentment than all their other injuries and insults put together. This order states, in substance, that his Catholic Majesty has agreed to cede the province, *as it was held by the French when ceded to his Majesty*; that is, unencumbered with the stipulations of the American treaty.—In consequence of all these signs of approaching danger, several of the Atlantic state legislatures have come to resolutions expressive of their determination to support the general government of the union in resisting all acts of aggression and injustice, which have taken place, or may take place, relative to the Mississippi; and, the people on the Western side of the Alleghany mountains have addressed themselves to the President and two Houses of Congress, in a tone, which shew, at once, the magnitude of the injury they suffer, their impatience at the forbearance of the general government, and the total want of power, in that government, to retain their allegiance, one hour longer than they are disposed to yield it.—But we must hear themselves speak:—"We, the "undersigned inhabitants of the Western "Country, respectfully represent—That the "Port of New Orleans is closed against us, "by a decree of the Spanish Intendant.—"That we owe the United States arrears "of excise, and other debts and taxes, and "have no means to discharge those de-"mands, but the produce of our farms. "That shut out, as we are, from a market "for our produce in the East, it must rot "on our hands, unless the government re-"ceive it from us at a reasonable price, "or protect us in the prosecution of a law-"ful trade: that in our humble opinion, "prompt and decisive measures are ne-"cessary; for the maxim is peculiarly ap-"plicable to our situation, that "*protection* "and *allegiance* are reciprocal." We take "leave further to represent, that we rely "with confidence on the immediate inter-"position of the United States; but while "we state our trust in the government of "the Union, and give assurance of our "co-operation in any decisive measure in "behalf of the just right of any part of "our country, we must declare that we "have a right to demand, and we do de-"mand, that the government either adopt "such measures as will secure us in the "prosecution of a lawful commerce, take "our produce from us at a reasonable "price, or otherwise *relieve us from contri-"butions of any kind whatever*. We wish "not unnecessarily to embarrass the com-"munication between the United States, "and the Spanish government, nor wan-"tonly to break in upon an amicable ad-"justment of a difference, which has arisen "from an unprovoked violation on their "part, of a solemn treaty; but we wish "the United States, explicitly to understand, "that our situation is critical, *that delay* "EVEN FOR ONE SEASON *would prove* "RUINOUS *to our country*; and that impe-"rious necessity may therefore compel us, "unless relief is afforded, to resort to mea-"sures which we may deem calculated to "insure protection to our trade, though "they may result in consequences *unfa-"vourable to the harmony of the Union*."—That is to say, that unless the general government can open for them the mouth of the Mississippi and its ports, they may be compelled to separate themselves from the union.—Lord Hawkesbury will say, that this looks well; that "putting the French "*upon the back* of the Americans will attach "the latter more closely to Great Britain." Yes; if you are ready to go *to war* for the purpose of aiding the Americans, this is true enough; but, then, what becomes of that long, secure, and thriving *peace*; that "peace and a large loaf," that "husbanding "of our resources," which were the objects of the treaty of Amiens, and for which objects such immense sacrifices were made? This address of the western people does not, however, discover any hostility *to France*; their hostility is to whoever shuts the mouth of the Mississippi against them, and their address clearly shows, that they, at any time, can, and will, *transfer their allegiance to whomsoever will secure to them the free navigation and the use of the ports of that river*. If, then, France be permitted to enter on the territory ceded to her by the Spaniards, she instantly becomes, if she chooses it, the sovereign of these people, and has at her command the means of destroying our West-India Colonies, and the American Union too. This is not, however, the course she will be likely to pursue. She

* See this proclamation and the other documents on the subject, Vol. III. p. 240. See also letters to Ld. Hawkesbury, Vol. III. p. 226 and 297.

will, as we have remarked over and over again *, make use of this new acquisition for the purpose of furthering her great, and, indeed, her sole object, that object to which she renders all others subservient,—the destruction of the commerce and credit of Great Britain, and, finally, the subjugation of Great Britain herself.—We reminded the ministers, before the definitive treaty was concluded, that if they made that treaty, tacitly acknowledging as valid, the cession of Louisiana to France, that the commercial relationships of the United States must inevitably fall under the controul of Buonaparté or his successor; and, the public, who, as well as the ministers, then turned a deaf ear to us, will now probably pay more attention to the Americans themselves, amongst whom this opinion is become universal. We shall, out of hundreds of articles which lie before us, in the American papers, take the following from a Charlestown print, called THE TIMES, of the 15th of February last.—"If we once begin to "*negotiate* with Buonaparté, we are un- "done. He knows how to mingle, to the "greatest degree of nicety and precision, "all the materials of his universal nostrum, "*treaty*: he, better than any one, under- "stands his man, and knows how to ap- "propriate to his patient's nerves the "quantity of menace and concession, that "will best answer his purpose of bringing "down the fever of national pride. To "use the words of one of the greatest "statesmen living.—'*The game will not be* "*fairly played. Buonaparté is a player, who,* "*if the game is going against him, will be apt to* "*pick a quarrel, and ask us, if* WE CAN "DRAW *our swords.*'" † In short, some "concession will be extorted, some com- "pensation demanded, which it would be "ignominious in us to grant. What will "be the consequence of refusal? The "Western States will be seduced by "France, and gradually melt into her arms. "Once a neighbour, and in the habit of "laying claims and making objections, of "treating and of threatening, of frater- "nizing with us or of cutting our throats, "every day will produce some new trivial "demand, with which, because it is trivial, "and the evils of war great, we shall be "disposed to comply. *Our commerce will* "*gradually get under the direction of the Chief* "*Consul: our commercial relations with all the* "*other states of Europe will be made to give way* "*to the designs of France*, and we and ours "shall be *as much under the controul of St.* "*Cloud, as Spain and Holland are at this mo-* "*ment.*"—Here, then, is the comment on the speeches of our ministers; here is the test of the knowledge and foresight of the sapient Mr. Addington, who thought it *as easy to attack the United States from St. Domingo as from Louisiana*; * of the gallant and watchful General Maitland, who thought that Louisiana would give the French *no influence over the United States*; † of the *solid* and *steady*, and *safe* Lord Hawkesbury, who thought that placing the French upon the back of the Americans would *attach the latter more closely to Great Britain*; ‡ of the Master of the Rolls, who said that the importance of Louisiana had been *discovered only a few nights before*, and that, as to any danger to this country, from the cession of that province to France, such danger might happen, *in the course of ages*, but it *could not be soon!* ||—And these, these are the men, that make our treaties! These are the men who have at their mercy the interests, the honour, the safety, and the very existence of the nation!

VIEWS OF FRANCE.—Of the millions of rumours, which reach us from France, none, except those which speak of preparations and a disposition for destroying this country are to be relied on. This day fortnight, the last division of troops sailed from Dunkirk for St. Domingo (or for some other quarter); that was the professed destination of it, and it consisted of about 3,000

* See Register, Vol. I. p. 44, 119, 266, 353, 398, 427, 443, 489, 515.

† This "one of the greatest statesmen living" is not *Lord Hawkesbury*; no, nor *Mr. Addington* either. The words quoted by this American writer, are taken from *Mr. Windham's* speech of the 4th of November, 1801.—See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1161.—The reader will remember, that Lord Hawkesbury, in order to catch a little popularity with the Americans, said, that Mr. Windham had *under-rated* the population and power of the United States. (See Vol. II. p. 1309.) This has failed. The Americans despise him most heartily; and, this country may rest assured, that, while *he* is amongst the King's ministers, no confidence will be placed in British faith, by the people of America.—This "*safe* politician's" idea of "placing the *French upon the back* of America, in order to *attach the latter more closely to Great Britain*," has something in it, at once so silly, so selfish, so mischievous, and so malignant, that the people who should trust him afterwards, would deserve to be betrayed and destroyed.—Mr. Windham very justly reprobated this grovelling notion, this trait of low cunning: *he* said, "You "are placing *a serpent in the bosom of America*, "which, ere long, will destroy her." These sentiments have not been overlooked, nor will they soon be forgotten by the Americans, who, if Britain were under the guidance of high and honourable councils like those of Mr. Windham, might easily be animated to such a resistance of the Gallic power, as would not only provide lasting security for themselves, but would, at the same time, give a decided turn to the affairs of the world.

* See Debates, Vol. II. p. 1211. † Ibid. p. 1377.
‡ Ibid. p. 1309.
|| See Debates, Vol. II. p. 1344.

men, the remainder of the 89th demi-brigade. Our ministers must, however, know, by this time, that these "colonial services" and enterprizes, which, even by the King's message, they teach us to regard as *the means of our security*, do not retard those preparations, which are intended for the invasion of this kingdom, and which may, perhaps, be regarded, by Buonaparté at least, as being also destined for *colonial* service. In the bason of Dunkirk, and in the Canal, leading from that place to Gravelines, there are upwards of 150 flat-bottomed boats, measuring 60 feet keel, carrying each a 24-pounder in her bow, and having stocks all round wheron to fix swivels. Of these boats, which carry from 100 to 120 men each, a great number are kept in the canals all the way between Dunkirk and Ostend; so that, in two or three tides, boats sufficient to receive from 30,000 to 40,000 men, can be assembled, at either Ostend, Dunkirk, Gravelines, or Calais. The same sort of boats are prepared, in great abundance, at Boulogne and Havre de Grace, In the Interior, the military conscription is going on in all its rigour. The conscripts, tied two and two, and escorted by dragoons, are marching to the army, from every village in France. The state, temper, and conduct of these people always put us in mind of Don Quixote's galley-slaves. Woe be unto him who attempts to set them free!—Not that we are *alarmed* at these preparations; we state the facts merely as proofs of the *disposition*, not of the *power*, which France has to invade and plunder this country. We speak, however, conditionally here; because it depends, not on France, BUT ON US, whether we are to be subdued, or not.—Buonaparté and his comrades are resolved on war with England. Such a war is, for the reasons stated by our correspondent SWENSKA, * absolutely necessary to the duration of their authority, and, perhaps, of their very lives. That they do not *wish* for war, just at this moment, we believe; yet, they will not make any sacrifices or concessions to *us*, for the purpose of avoiding it. To Russia they will yield so far as may be found necessary to insure her *neutrality*, which, with the aid of the Hawkesburian convention, will serve them more effectually, perhaps, than a co-operation, on the part of Russia, in the war. If our poor drivelling ministers have been supported, in their present fit of vigour, by any misunderstanding between Russia and our enemies, they will soon find that prop withdrawn from beneath them; for, the politicians of St. Petersburgh, will have the address to make *our* armament the means of obtaining their ends with the Consul, who, in his turn, will endeavour to squeeze a compensation, of some sort or other, from us.—The system of the French, for the destruction of this country, is purely *a system of terror*, by which they hope, and not without some foundation, to break up our national credit *. For this purpose, they will make us arm twice or three times a year; and, they do, indeed, at this moment, absolutely "hold our funds in their hands," a phrase which, in describing their fatal influence, we made use of several months ago. When was it ever heard of till now, that the holders of stock looked to the *French* Houses for a signal for selling or purchasing? —It is truly pitiable, it is disgusting, to hear people expressing a hope, "that ministers "will not disarm, till they have *settled* all "the points in dispute, and have given us a "real, and not an imaginary peace." It is not in their power so to settle matters with Buonaparté and his comrades, whose trade is war, and whose *system* it is to keep us in a constant state of uncertainty and alarm,—a system never to be frustrated except by a war, a serious and resolute war, terminating in a reduction of the territory and the power, if not in a total change in the affairs of France. This remedy may, to some persons, appear worse than the disease; but, let them consider, that the disease brings *certain* political death, whereas the remedy *may* not only prevent death, but may preserve life, and even restore us to health. Nor let the selfish votaries of wealth and frivolity flatter themselves with the hope that the disease will be a *lingering* one. It will not be many years; perhaps not many months, in producing a catastrophe the most dreadful that ever was exhibited on earth. Let them remember, that the question is not, whether we shall have war, or live in peace, with Buonaparté; but, whether we shall have war with him now, or stop 'till the moment when it perfectly suits him.—— Against one thing, above all others, we beg leave to caution our readers, and this is, the delusive notion of security to be derived from the *poverty* of France. The statements of the French financiers may be very fallacious, as far as we know; but the falsehood of those statements do not diminish the means of the vast empire, which the Corsican and his comrades have formed, nor do they weaken those bonds, by the means of which the commerce and colonies of Holland and the mines of Spain are made tributary to France, and are, in effect, rendered her property.—Upon this subject, we cannot help adverting to a passage in the ministerial paper, the True Briton, of Thursday last, a passage which is well worthy of the pen of our own able financier.—"In the report of

* See Swenska, p. 480, et seq.

" the minister of the French finances, there " is, for the year nine, a trifling sum of " 32,000,000 francs, *pour faire des négocia-* " *tions*; and for the year ten, the bagatelle " of 15,505,000 francs for the same expenses " of negotiations, besides ten millions, called " unforeseen expenses. It is impossible, in " a more *concise* and *clear* manner to inform " the *free* French nation how nearly 60 " millions are employed."—This really smells strong of the Treasury. But, are there not two edges to this Addingtonian wit? In the *year nine* France had to pay for negotiating *the preliminary treaty*, and, in the *year ten*, the *definitive treaty!* If, therefore, she gained, by the three millions sterling expended on those negotiations, a conquest which cost us three hundred millions sterling, she did not make so very bad a bargain. Her treasurer may not, indeed, have his conscience quite so clear as the Richmond Park Minister, the prosecutor of the tin-man of Plymouth; but, we think the 60 millions of *ten-penny* livres are, if we look at the effects they have produced, infinitely better accounted for than the last 60 millions of *twenty shilling* livres, which Mr. Addington has expended.

SAVINGS OF PEACE!—To " husband our " resources" was one of the motives for making the numerous and important sacrifices of the treaty of Amiens. What, then, will be *the amount* of those savings? This should be an object of immediate enquiry, did we not think it a mark of respect due to Lord Auckland, to wait the result of those deep researches, which, his Lordship is now making for the benefit of his country. We cannot, however, be expected long to restrain our desire to enter on this subject, especially when the reader is informed, that we actually have, at this moment, spread out upon the table all Mr. Addington's apparatus. Indeed, we do intend to make, next week, a complete exposure of this gentleman's financial quackery, from the conclusion of the peace to the present day; and, not to insult the understandings of our readers, we shall address it to the minister himself.

FIFTY SHIPS OF THE LINE.—Our readers will recollect, that, in the debate, on the 2d of December last, Mr. Addington stated to the House of Commons, that, such was the excellent situation of the navy, that " *fifty* " ships of the line, could, in case of emer- " gency, be got ready for sea in the course " of *a month*." That month is now nearly expired; for, though the King's messages, do not contain the word " *emergency*," yet an emergency must certainly be understood to exist now, and to have existed, ever since, at least, the message to Parliament, notifying his Majesty's intention to call out the Militia, and since the issuing of the proclamation, by which that Message was immediately followed; for, the Militia law, 42 Geo. III. Cap. 90. § iii, authorises his Majesty to issue such proclamation, only " in cases of *actual* " *invasion*, or upon *imminent danger* thereof, " and in all cases of *rebellion* and *insurrec-* " *tion*." Thank God, we all know that there is neither rebellion nor insurrection in the kingdom! nor has there yet any actual invasion taken place; *imminent danger of invasion* must therefore exist, else the issuing of the proclamation was improper, nay it was absolutely *unlawful*; and, if imminent danger of invasion be not "a case of emergency," we should be greatly obliged to Mr. Addington to tell us what he considers as the evidence of such a case.——A case of emergency has, then, if we suppose the cabinet to have known the secret only eight days before the public, already existed for *a month*, and, instead of "*fifty* ships of the line ready for sea," will the modest assurance of Mr. Addington enable him to tell the Parliament, that he has *six* ships of that description ready for sea? No; even he will not, he dare not say he has: for, there are not yet *five*, and we defy any one to disprove what we say. *In commission!* Yes, there are enough in commission. There are many in commission, without men, or sails, and even without masts. There are plenty of hulks in commission. How many ships are there *fit for sea?* That's the question. Week after week, we have said that we have not *six* ships of the line, in Europe, fit for sea; and can any one believe, that the ministers would not have disproved our statement, if it had been in their power? The newspapers make a great parade of ships put in commission and officers appointed. It is very easy to draw out fleets upon paper; but not so easy to draw them out of the deadening clutches of Lord St. Vincent. The public has been told, that Lord Nelson is to hoist his flag on board the Victory: if he does, he must hang it upon his walking-stick, or something else other than a mast; for, we are well assured, that the Victory cannot be got out to sea in six months.—At Chatham there were, last week, 190 shipwrights short of the peace establishment, though the men of 35 years were admitted. During the dreadful visitation, which the Admiralty Lords made to the Dock-yards, they turned off a great number of men, who had served 20 years, without superannuating them, as it had always before been the custom; and they are now actually endeavouring to find out these very men to bring them back to the yards.—Since that visitation, the apprentices, in all the yards, whose time has expired, have generally quitted the

king's service, a circumstance unprecedented in the history of our navy. In short, such has been, and such is the distrust, the ill blood, the disgust, that pervades every department under these ignorant, capricious, and unfeeling men, that the whole machine is at a stand; and, if they continue where they now are, that machine will be completely destroyed *.

Well must the public remember, and with no small degree of displeasure, the answer made to Mr. Elliot, on this subject, by Mr. Yorke, who, most assuredly, knew very little of what he said. The former gentleman had asked, on the 23d of November:—"Is Ireland in a state of safety? "Where is our channel fleet, the bulwark "of our coasts? Your savings have been "made out of the very vital security of the "country."—† To this the Secretary of War replied: "We have not, to be sure, "thirty or forty sail of the line lying at "Spithead; but, we have a fleet greater "than ever it was in peace, or even during "part of the late war; not stationed in one "port, I allow, but scattered over the "world. With the *aid* of the noble Lord "at the head of the Admiralty, and the "*regulations which he has introduced*, a system "is formed, which would enable us, *at any* "*time*, to put a force to sea *fully adequate for* "*our defence*; and, therefore, there is no "cause of dismay ‡ on account of our "navy."—It is charity to suppose, that the Secretary's constant attention to his own office, rendered him totally ignorant of the situation of the navy; for, bad as this excuse may be, it is the only one that can possibly be offered for such a declaration, made at such a time, and under such circumstances. That Lord St. Vincent and his two sapient Phocæ persuaded the other ministers, and even themselves, that they were able to send out a fleet at a few weeks notice, we can readily conceive; but that they *never* will get one *to sea* we believe most sincerely. The system, to which the Secretary at War alludes, is, we presume, the new system of guarding this island by *blocks* and *hulks*! "We are "happy," says the ministerial paper, "to "state, from authority, that the blocks, "which are to protect the mouth of the "Thames, will be ready in a few days." What a source of *happiness*! what a subject for exultation!—By referring to our account of the present distribution of the navy, p. 512, the reader will perceive, that there are now in commission, in Europe, 26 sail of the line; and, by turning back to pp. 143 and 310, of the present volume, he will find, that, on the 1st of February there were 9 in commission, and, on the 1st of March, 10. Since the 1st of March, then, that is to say, *a month* since the ministry must have known of the existence of that *imminent danger of invasion*, and, consequently, that case of emergency, which they communicated to Parliament on the 9th of March; in this month, the space of time in which Mr. Addington promised the Parliament and the nation to get *fifty* ships of the line ready for sea, in this whole month only 16 ships have been added to the number in commission, the whole of which, even according to the swelled-out account of the Admiralty themselves, amount to no more than 26. But, let not the country deceive itself by this phrase, "ships *in commission*." Ships may be for years in commission, without ever being, for one hour, fit for service. Mr. Addington's promise related to ships *fit for sea*. The whole 200 ships of the line may be put in commission in five minutes; but to get them out to sea, and that too in a condition to meet an enemy, is quite another thing. We have now 26 ships of the line in commission, in Europe; and, of the whole 26, there are not yet *six* fit for sea. We repeat this assertion with confidence; we pledge our veracity and the reputation of our work for the truth of it, and we call upon those editors, who are daily publishing such pompous accounts of warlike preparations, to contradict us, not by abuse and base calumny, but by facts. We are not bound to prove a negative; it is, indeed, in this, as in many other instances, next to impossible to do it; but, if Mr. Addington had his *fifty* ships, or even *five* of them, actually ready for sea, how easy would it be just to publish their *names*, with those of their commanders, and to state, opposite each, the number of men on board? How easy would it be to do this? Aye, and how eagerly would it be done!—There is, it seems, *one* ship of the line got out, at last, and (see the distribution) she is on the Downs and North Sea stations. She has room enough at any rate. In the English and Irish Channels, there is not even a 50 gun ship. Suppose the French were to run out three or four ships of the line, with a few frigates, well loaded with troops, and were to make for some port of Ireland. What would be the consequence? And who shall say, that they will not do this, even while they seem to recede from some important point in ne-

* The two lawyers belonging to what has been very significantly called "the Navy *abuse* Board," lately instituted, have, we are told, resigned their places; so that, a new act must pass, we believe, or this board is at an end.—May not the resignation be a mere excuse for putting the disgusting and mischievous institution to a silent death?

† See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1087.

‡ Ibid. p. 1091.

gotiation? The ministers have talked of their *responsibility*: let them beware lest it prove, at last, something more than a mere pretext for withholding a knowledge of the divers acts, by which they sacrificed the interest and honour of their country.—At the breaking out of the last war, the ships of the line in commission were, in the space of one month, increased from 17 to 30, not *merely* in commission, but *fit for sea*; and, the sailors were, in the same space of time, increased from 12,000 to 18,000, *without having recourse to press-warrants*; whereas, with the aid of press-warrants, the last month has not, we are well informed, added more than 4000 seamen to the fleet!—And these are the facts which we are to draw a veil over, lest we should dishearten the people, and lest we should expose our weakness to the enemy. As if that enemy did not know the state of our navy as well as Lord St. Vincent and Captain Markham! As if he had not, in all our ports, better-informed and more diligent men than they have! To the charge, the foolish, canting, and false charge, of "disheartening the peo-"ple," we replied in our last, p. 446, and have only to add here, that if the people are to be disheartened by a description of probably approaching danger, how vain is it to hope, that they will have the public spirit and the courage to resist and overcome that danger, when it actually arrives! when it comes upon them like a thief in the night!—It is, too, somewhat strange to hear this charge from men who are *happy* to inform their "fellow citizens," that *blocks* are preparing to guard the mouth of the Thames! There is little chance, we should think, of adding to the fears of people like these. The mouth of the Thames guarded by blocks! How are the mighty fallen! How rapid has been our decline, how tremendously swift has the work of degradation gone on, since the 1st of October, the accursed 1st of October, 1801! But, the truth is, that a people, who yield themselves to such men as those who made the treaty of peace; a people who silently, and even willingly, yield themselves to the disposal of such men, merely for the sake of indulging their selfishness and ease, merely for the sake of avoiding the exertion of those pecuniary and personal means, which the Almighty has liberally bestowed on them; a people so degenerate not only must, but they *ought*, to be subdued; having basely yielded the honours won by their forefather, they ought also to be bereft of their name; having misused, despised, and trodden under foot, the manifold blessings of Providence, they ought no longer to enjoy its protection.—"They shall cast their silver in the streets, "and their gold shall be removed: *their "silver and their gold shall not be able to deliver "them.*—I will bring *the worst of the heathen*, "and they shall possess their houses: I will "also make the pomp of the strong to "cease; and their holy places shall be de-"filed. Destruction cometh: they shall *seek "peace*, and there shall be *none*."—As it is impossible not to perceive a most striking resemblance between the character and conduct of the Jewish nation, previous to the Babylonish captivity, and that of the British nation at the present day, so are we most seriously and most fearfully persuaded, that there will be a resemblance not less striking in their punishment, unless we instantly resolve to tread back the steps we have trodden, to pursue a new line of conduct, to adopt notions and principles far different from those which have, for the last ten years, prevailed in our councils; to appeal to the sense and honour, and not to the ignorance and baseness of the nation, to rely upon our valour, and not upon our purse.

POLITICS OF FRANCE.

(*Continued from Page 424.*)

Buonaparte's opinion on the finances of England has been repeatedly expressed to the following effect:

1. That the annual expenditure amounting to such an immense sum, the ministry dared not augment it; and therefore they made peace.

2. That the peace, having enabled the Republic to secure all the valuable possessions of France, Holland, Spain and Portugal, and to exclude Great Britain from the continent of Europe, when occasion may require, the British merchants and men of property, seeing the nation deprived of every possibility of making new conquests and of extending their commerce and manufactures, will not come forward with their money to enable the government to recommence a war, which can produce nothing but public danger.

3. That, should a ministry obtain the confidence of the public, so as to be able to raise the funds, to re-equip the navy and organize the army, with the other expenses attendant on warlike preparations, would, in the course of the first two years, absorb a capital, the interest of which, would require ten millions sterling to be raised an-

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nually upon the public: a sum, that, added to the present expenditure, would either revolutionize the country, or make a national bankruptcy inevitable.

So that, although the ministry in parliament declared the resources of the nation to be still abundant to continue the war, it was perfectly evident, that the danger which they apprehended from the pressure of the public burdens, was the real cause that made them sue for peace.

It is rather unmannerly of Buonaparté, to say, that old England sued for peace! However, if it be true, as the world really believes it is, that the terms of the peace have broken down those bulwarks, which centuries of warfare, "heaps of treasure "and streams of British blood had raised "around the British empire," and that the soul and body of the empire itself, are thereby exposed to the uplifted daggers of a Jacobin Republic, we cannot, should we dislike the Consul's Philippics, with any sort of plausibility deny the fact.—At no period of the war was the situation of France so critical, as just when the preliminaries of London were signed. To have lost the battle of Marengo, might have lost the progress of the campaign, but the consequence would have been nothing more. At the juncture we refer to, the existence of the Republic, the destiny of France, hung upon the will of an irritated and all powerful enemy. The British navy was completely mistress of the Ocean, of the Gulph of Mexico, the Baltic, Mediterranean and Indian seas; from the Point of Florida to Cape Horn, and from Madagascar to Japan, every island, port and place, were under our command, and at our disposal; as were also the continent of Africa, Egypt, Syria, Natolia, Cyprus, Candia, the Morea and Grecian islands, Malta, Sicily, and Lisbon. No nation ever stood in such a posture. And sue for peace! A frank declaration to the world, and a liberal proposition to the court of Petersburgh and to the United States, would have instantaneously rallied all the sovereigns of Europe and America (the king of Spain not excepted) around the British standard. Then we might have consolidated our maritime empire, every state that bordered on the sea would have become our natural ally, and all civilized nations our cordial and constant friends. And France, republic or monarchy, no matter which, might have been finally remanded within the limits of her own legal dominions. These Buonaparté saw, and by an address, (or, perhaps, from our want of address), he snatched away the fruit of all our toils. The very means we then possessed, to have interwoven the interests of Europe and America with our own, the Consul is now dealing out to unite the world in enmity against us.

It cannot fail to be highly gratifying to the present rulers of France, to hear maintained in the British senate, a doctrine, in itself preposterous, and in its effects the most dangerous that ever was introduced into the councils of a king—to wit; that, "to retain in peace conquests made in war, marks ambition, rouses the jealousy of other powers, and creates enemies to the state: whereas, to give up conquests bought with our blood, manifests magnanimity and moderation, and quiets the anxiety of our neighbours: the latter is therefore, in sound policy, to be preferred." We shall not comment on this dangerous and cowardly precept; but merely observe, that if it be persisted in, Great Britain will not long be the envy of her neighbours. She is now, no more their dread!

Jealousy arises from rivality, which implies a pretension to equal power; as Great Britain lately stood, no such pretension could have been set up; or if it had, to what purpose? In possession of the object, and able to defend it, the jealousy of rivals soon dies in its own impotence. If, to avoid the jealousy of those whose rivality we always despised, we have (as it is said) given up the object, viz.—the sources and securities of our maritime preponderance, we have no great chance to meet with a similar modesty on the part of our neighbours. While Buonaparté can command their obedience, all the powers of Europe may burn with jealousy as long as they please, for what he cares.

To return from this digression.—The British ministers, deprived of every prospect of gaining by war, now talk of getting money to enable them to *recommence* hostilities. For, if they could still add to the national debt and public imposts, that very circumstance would ruin the government. The British ministry must, therefore, to preserve the state, maintain the peace; and that proud nation must be a passive spectator of the rising glories of France.

Such is the opinion of the Chief Consul; and, we are sorry to add, that it is more, or less, the opinion of all the governments of continental Europe.

To justify his calculation and insure the pacific neutrality of Great Britain, Buonaparté will keep the government in a continual state of suspense. To oblige the ministry to carry the annual expenditure, more and more above the receipt of the public revenue, the Consulate will order,

or pretend to have ordered, squadrons of gun-boats and light vessels, to be built and armed on the Mississippi, on the Rio-grande de la Madalena, and on the Oronoco. The republic will form, or talk of forming settlements, on the Red and Winnipeg lakes, in Tupinamb and Cap-del-rey. Orders will likewise be given, to build squadrons on the Euphrates, at Bassora, Gombaroon, on the Indus, and on the lakes in Siba; to take possession and fortify the islands of Salsetta, Ormus and Kismish; the posts of Aden, Zeila, the islands and ports of Camarana, Erquiko and Monbaza, will be ceded to France; * and the republic will make settlements in Sindi, Guzerat, Aracan and Pegu. † A treaty with the emperor Alexander to reinstate the Mogul and hereditary princes of Indostan in their former rank and possessions, will be approved of by the Sophi of Persia, consecrated by the Grand Lama and cried through the streets of London, Calcutta, Madrass and Delhi. A senatus-consultus, prohibiting the importation of British manufactures and the consumption of British cured fish in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Turkey, and forbidding the transit of British produce through Holland and up the Rhine, will be talked of, perhaps really issued: and a convention to recover and maintain the liberty of the sea, under the auspices of France and Russia, will be acceded to by all the maritime states of Europe. ‡

Besides these menaces abroad, we shall be amused with the Consul's preparations at home; dozens of line-of battle ships will be launching monthly in the ports of Holland, France and Spain; gunboats will rise in the channel like mushrooms; and St. Valery, Boulogne, Mardik, Dunkirk and Flushing will be converted into spacious impregnable naval harbours. * Naval manœuvres, † military encampments, sham fights and reviews, will be exhibited, to astonish and terrify the swarms of our gaping countrymen, who, to the disgrace of the British name, are daily flocking to cringe and bow before their sovereign's timid foe!

Britons have for many ages been considered as the people possessing the most laudable and dignified national pride: they are the only people in Europe who have neither been beaten, nor in any wise humiliated during the course of the late revolution war; and it is remarkable, that after the peace, they are the only people who, in a contemptible admiration for a rebel chief, have lost sight of their own and their country's worth. Other nations have been despoiled and conquered, they have bowed to the tyrant's sceptre by compulsion; but peers of England, British senators, and Englishmen of all descriptions seem to regret the valor of their defenders; they are proud to be noticed in the ring of Buonaparté's gallic slaves; and hurry in crowds to offer their oblations to the foul priestess of that polluted temple of treason (the Tuilleries), still rancid with a sovereign's blood! We cannot here avoid mentioning a circumstance that lately happened on the continent: one of the first monarchs in Europe, desired a nobleman at his court to prepare to go as his Ambassador, or rather Plenipotentiary, to Buonaparté; the other replied, "for the first time that ever "a ———— demurred to execute the "orders of his master, I am, upon this oc-"casion, proud to disobey your Majesty's "commands. As an officer, I cannot be "the instrument to compromise the dignity

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* To possess and secure the command of the gulph of Ormus and straits of Babelmandel, is not a new speculation; if the late Empress Catherine II. would have countenanced the views of France, that project would have been attempted in 1785 and 1786. Perhaps Buonaparté may have more influence in the councils of the present emperor than Vergennes had in those of Catherine.

† With respect to the Dutch settlements abroad, as they were given up at Amiens, they will be garrisoned and stored without any unnecessary parade or pompous demonstration. It is inconceivable how the people of England can be so far deluded, as not to see, that the ci-devant Dutch colonies in Asia, Africa and America, are, and must necessarily be, subject to the Consulate. Every body knows, that the Batavian Republic is a department of France; and it requires no very deep sagacity to see, that Buonaparté will make the appurtenances of his departments subservient to the execution of his future projects.

‡ To these demonstrations, will no doubt be added some diplomatic altercation; for instance, the French minister may tread upon the British Ambassador's toes at Peterburgh, or at Constantinople; a Danish ballad-singer may be paid to draw another resemblance of the king's minister at Copenhagen, a French jew buying, or pretending to buy muskets there, may again attempt to purchase a passport at his excellency's office; the vice president of Italy will arrest, or cause to be deported some dozens of our English beaux from Rome or Naples; and the Prefect of Switzerland will, by mistake, hang an English secretary there for a spy, &c.

* We believe it is intended to make St. Valery the grand naval depôt for the flotillas and light squadrons of the republic, in the channel.

† In case of another war, these manœuvres will be so managed, as to make it appear to the people of England, that no serious invasion is intended; and squadrons will no doubt be sacrificed to shew, that if such really was intended, to land would be impossible. To disarm, or turn our opponent off his guard is always an advantage; no matter by what means.

Mr. Fox indeed, denied this, and any argument supported by so great a name acquires a lustre not its own.—"Are we to "be told," he exclaimed, "that ministers "dared make no peace, because the unseasonable ambition of France may now "drive us to hostilities? Are we to be told "that we must wage war till we had obtained a satisfactory assurance on the part "of the enemy of a sincere desire to cultivate the blessings of tranquillity in the "true spirit of peace?"—In the *full* extent of this principle, certainly not. But though the want of this satisfactory assurance does not *altogether preclude* peace, yet does it very much reduce the value of it, and ought equally to lower the price we are willing to give. This sincere disposition to peace on the part of the enemy, is indeed, by far the most important point to be considered; it is of greater value than a colony more, or a sugar island less, because a *free nation* like this seeks only honourable security at the end of war, and the amicable temper of our rival is a better pledge for this than his humiliation. It was lacking *this*, that made the cessions under the late treaty doubly mischievous to the country. The peace of Amiens wanted this wholesome complexion which might promise its long life, and its late admirers already feel that if it is a beauty, it is but a candle-light beauty, whose artificial charms, though they might please while contemplated only by the taper of Mr. Addington's abilities, must fade away before the broad day of experience.

This general principle needs only to be fully stated, I should think, to be acknowledged.—When treating with a man whose enmity was founded on the interests of his ambition, aggravated by the satanic pride of his nature, and embittered by recent defeat;—whose friendship was as fatal to some, even as his enmity, whose abilities, unrestrained by conscience, were surpassed only by his boundless ambition, whose perfidy had ere now stained the olive branch with blood, and mixed poison in the cup of peace. —In treating with such a man, no able minister would make great sacrifices for peace. He would see what little difference there was between the enmity and friendship of such a man, and however anxious for tranquillity, yet wisely setting but little value on the hollowness of such a peace, he would pay but a small price for it, *at least he would not purchase it at an exorbitant price.*

Now, Sir, this general principle being admitted, we proceed to the application. And I will ask any candid man, the ministers themselves, whether there were *any* traits in the physiognomy of Buonaparté's character resembling the enemy above supposed?—Whether in proportion to the predominance of those features, the security, and thereby, the value of peace were not reduced?—And consequently, whether we should not have been justified in offering but few cessions to obtain it?—But *in fact*, whether we did not make more and greater sacrifices, than we had ever done for any peace since the existence of the monarchy? —When they have answered these questions, let ministers tell us, whether having paid this high price, we are not bereft of the advantages of our contract, of the security which peace ought to bring, perhaps, plunged in a renewal of the war?—Then let them say, if they dare insult common sense so much, that the treaty of Amiens is not defective, which paid so high a consideration for such a paltry truce; or that they, who concluded that treaty, are not to blame, are not unworthy of confidence, are not guilty of the calamities that now threaten us.

The general character of the late peace is ample proof of the imbecility of its framers; but there is one article that even beggars the rest, I mean that respecting Malta, which was probably the germ of our present embarrassment. I grant we have no right to assume for certain, that Malta is the point in dispute at present: yet when we consider that the article which professed to restore the order, depended for its execution on the guarantee of a power not a party to the treaty, that that power has refused its guarantee, and that we have kept possession long after the time fixed by the late treaty for the evacuation of Malta had expired; we must naturally conclude, that Malta is at least one of the questions in discussion.—Nor ought we to wonder at this; for never was any thing stipulated in every part so contradictory and impracticable as the restoration and the patch-work government of the order.

The nugatory nature of that article was proved long ago *à priori*, and experience has since confirmed it. But for a ministry whose motto was present safety, and who claimed as their chief merit the restoration of peace, to leave an important point which was virtually undecided, which must require ulterior negotiation, and might therefore renew the war; and that too when treating with an ambitious conqueror who would never fear appealing to the sword, and when *we paid down* so vast a price for peace, seems little short of madness. If Buonaparté be hostilely inclined, as ministers fear, what better opportunity can he have to colour over a violation of the treaty

than Malta affords? And to whom does he owe this opportunity? If the Consul made peace only to prepare for war, no article was ever better contrived, on which to renew hostilities, and were it not known of what mild elements our ministry is composed, it would be natural to conclude, that they made peace with the same perfidious intention.—Of this however, all Europe will acquit them, and, even should they renew the war, very justly conclude, that they did it by accident.

Sir, these arguments against the treaty in general, and the article respecting Malta are not new. Mr. Addington and his colleagues have repeatedly heard them urged both in and out of Parliament, at the time they concluded this peace. They cannot plead ignorance, they sinned against the country with the truth before them.—And now they come to ask for confidence on the very occasion that proves them unworthy of it.

We cannot expect that those who sacrificed so much, and obtained only a precarious truce, will now conclude an arrangement that may hush all disputes without degradation; or that the projectors of Mr. Moore's expedition will not commit the honour of the nation by menaces made only to be abandoned, and by armaments fitted out with much noise and bluster, only to publish more completely our subsequent submission. This last, I own Sir, is what I dread. Ministers I see assume a threatening attitude, and strut the militia through the kingdom; but I fear, if they remain in office, they will soon be *planet struck* and submit. Our premier, may perhaps, attempt the part of the "bold thunder," while his noble colleague may perform the "brisk lightning;" but neither, I believe, will surpass Mr. Bayes's actors in the Rehearsal; nor much intimidate the hero of Jaffa, who, once cradled the rocking elements of civil discord, now "rides on the whirlwind and directs the storm."—The authors of the late peace will soon relapse into timidity under the name of confidence; and discover the virtues of Buonaparté where they first found them, in their own weakness. For, had they judged of the reliance to be placed on the treaty of Amiens, by the character of the other contracting party, had they estimated his character by his actions, and his future conduct by his past, they would not have committed this country to his faith or his moderation. If the nation tries them by the same standard, it will not repose the trust they claim; it will support the King against his enemies, but it will beseech him to call another to the field, nor entrust the banner of national honour to a hand, which, too feeble to wield the sword, will unfurl the ensign, only to lay it prostrate at the feet of a haughty rival.

I am Sir, &c. X.

ON ENGLAND.

From the Paris Journal, called the "Journal du Commerce," of March 18, 1803.

The peace of Europe is the act of the French Government. After so dreadful a war it was, no doubt, the most splendid favour which could ever be conferred on long suffering humanity; and cotemporaries will indubitably, in this respect, anticipate the judgment both of the historian and posterity at large—it required a considerable degree of ability to divert Paul I. from his cruel and long existing prejudices, and to detach him from a coalition to which he must have been the more devoted, as he was peculiarly influenced by romantic sentiments of honour and glory; this was the first measure adopted for carrying into execution a system not less bold than great, namely, of urging, (as it were, between France and Russia) the belligerent powers, and compelling them to make peace, and expedite the execution of former treaties—that conception, which has already proved so beneficial in its consequences, was the most powerful guarantee which had ever been given to Europe of a solid and permanent peace.—England had twice imposed upon us—Lord Cornwallis would have perhaps given us a repetition of the part which Malmesbury had played—the circle of Popilius was drawn, and the Treaty was concluded.—A message from the King of England to the House of Commons throws a dark shade over the Peace, which was so much wished for, over this Peace, which is as necessary for his own subjects, as for the other nations of Europe.—Now what does this same Message contain? What relates to heads of nations is to be spoken of with great circumspection and respect—supposing even that ridicule were to attach to their decrees, a different conduct would be attended with serious consequences; on such occasions, jesting must be out of the question.—The King of Great Britain thinks it necessary to inform the House of Commons that, on account of the great preparations carrying on in the Ports of France and Holland, he deems it expedient to resort to measures of precaution for the safety of his dominions.—We can neither deny nor dissemble the state in which our Navy and that of Holland stood at the conclusion of the war—a Nation should possess a military power in proportion to the extent of its territory, and of its commercial relations, as well as to the force which may eventually be brought against it—the first care, therefore, of our Government should have been to restore our navy. The British Government did not, to be sure, consider it was implied in the treaty that it could, at will, set limits to the number of our ships, and send over a Commissary to the port of Dunkirk!—Those days are gone by. Why then this uneasiness with regard to a Government which aimed so cordially at peace, which negotiated it with all its means, which commanded it with all its power, a peace which became so necessary for

ruin, and who raised *them* to the dictatorship of the world? And will they oppose his endeavours to consolidate their situation? But they are oppressed, says John Bull! If we ask with what?—the whole of John's *corps diplomatique* cannot tell. In politics and in public society, oppression is relative. To attempt to scare Buonaparté with the jealousy of other powers, is, perhaps, still more ridiculous! Those who have any power, are his associates in despoiling those who have none. What benefit could the change of the name of a chief produce to Great Britain, or to Europe? Would a General Moreau or a Masena be less a Frenchman than Buonaparté? No,—but we say they may be less *habile!* When the ability of enemies becomes a consideration with Britons, then alas! our legislators may go home and plant potatoes.

It must be evident to the world, that the present rulers of the republic, from whatever point of view they are taken, can only be considered as rebel chiefs. They were born subjects of their king, most of them held offices in his service, and at mature age, swore allegiance to his government; he is alive, and at this time is morally, as well entitled to sit on the throne of France, as any hereditary monarch can be to sit on the throne of his ancestors. These usurpers know, that, however pliable and passive the politics of other governments may have, now and then, appeared, it cannot be presumed that legitimate sovereigns should prostitute the dignity of their stations, and expose the safety of their persons and families in so palpable a manner, as voluntarily to sanction the rebellion, robberies, pillage, and plunder of the republic; and associate in treaties of friendship and mutual support, with the irreconcileable enemies of all legal government. The chief consul knows, that the treaties, which he has imposed upon other states, are extorted bonds, and will never bind the conscience. He is well aware, that when his authority in France has occasion for help from abroad, his part of the drama will be nearly out. Nor can he suppose that his neighbours are less sensible, that the support of France implies her dominion. In short, he knows that his authority can only be legalized by ultimate success; and that *while any legal government possesses the means of opposition and resistence, the success of the French Republic cannot be considered as secure.* The consul may profess peace and friendship with all states; and he may offer alliances to the great, and protection to the weak; but every legitimate sovereign should know, that when the missionaries of Buonaparté approach his throne, they come either to spoil, crush, or undermine it. The destruction, or subjugation of all independent nations, especially of all rival powers, is with the rulers of France, *a principle of self-preservation*, and is, therefore, *interwoven with the very existence of their military community.*

We would not be understood to say, that the present government of France intends to conquer, and incorporate with the Republic, all other European states. On the contrary, we do not suppose that the consulate would wish Holland, Spain, nor perhaps Italy, more immediately under the police of France than those countries now are: nor, do we believe, that while Great Britain and Russia continue in their present posture, Buonaparté would countenance a farther reduction of Austria, nor the expulsion of the Turkish government from Europe. We consider the real system of the French Republic, to be neither more nor less, than, *an universal ascendency raised upon natural sources sufficient to maintain a preponderant power.* Such an ascendency is essential to the existence of the Republic, and it will be pursued as long, as that fabric does exist. The obstacles which stands most directly in the way of that pursuit, is *the naval empire of Great Britain*; its reduction is therefore the object, upon which the hero of the nineteenth century must first employ his natural and moral faculties, and all his supernatural talents.

OBSERVATIONS ON HIS MAJESTY'S LATE MESSAGE TO PARLIAMENT.

Sir,—However indubitable is the right of ministers in certain cases, to with-hold information on the treaty with France *pending the negotiation*; there is nevertheless, one point that admits of great doubt, and that is, whether the men who compose the present ministry are worthy of being trusted by Parliament with its confidence, and with that supply they ask to give weight to their negotiations. The minister not trusting merely to his master's prerogative to negotiate and to arm, comes to Parliament and asks the two Houses to make themselves *parties to the present armament and to the consequences of it.* But is the minister a man whose abilities will not commit the safety, and whose firmness will not compromise the honour of the Parliament and the nation?—To this, the only answer I find made by Mr. Addington is, "that he is responsible, deeply responsible to the country, but that if Parliament will trust him he will bring us out with honour at least of every difficulty."

When I read this, in the newspaper, Sir, I involuntarily turn to the first page of the

paper, to the advertisements of Doctors Brodum and Solomon, and many others, whose claims to confidence are full as good as the premier's.—Namely, the assurance with which they promise and the responsibility they incur. But if my constitution be ruined by their quackeries, will it be restored by an action for damages?—Had I not better preserve it at present, by denying these men my confidence and consulting some regular physician?—How far ministers deserve the confidence they claim is still a question, therefore, and can only be determined by a reference to their past conduct.

Now, Sir, immediately after the signature of the preliminaries of peace, Buonaparté as in the present instance, fitted out "*a vast armament while the most important negotiations were depending.*"—While our swords yet reeked with the best blood of France, while the wounds she had received in Egypt still smarted,—but ministers were not alarmed; though then not at peace they suffered the French fleets to sail. It is true, Buonaparté's armament did not prove hostile, but it does not follow, for that reason, that ministers were justified in trusting that to chance.—Perhaps, Sir, the Consul expected more from the docility of our administration, than to the rigour of his own armies; and the politician who looks to Alexandria and to Amiens, will probably applaud his judgment.—If this conjecture be well founded, (and the subsequent *present* hostile temper of the pacificator renders it highly probable,) Mr. Addington cannot plead the event as a justification of his confidence, for it is a maxim of reason as well as of law, that no man shall plead his own wrong.—But if, Sir, we condemn his tameness in 1801, let us look to his *vigour* in 1802; and I think, though the subjects are different we shall still recognize the hand of the same master.

The French diplomatists have dated the æra of their new system of European public law from the treaty of Luneville, but unfortunately this simple code which silences the contention of so many rights, by annihilating the powers that laid claim to them, was not exempt from some intricacies at which the simplicity of French justice was so much shocked in the former system; it acknowledged the independence of Switzerland, though in the near neighbourhood of the great nation. The warmest admirers of the new system must allow this to be a blemish. France, however, had herself formally recognized this independence, and Switzerland had not since then committed any act of hostility against France. But the Swiss people changed the form of government which was agreeable to the chief Consul, and substituted another, an act they had surely a right to do if they were independent, at least if that word has any meaning in French Dictionaries. Buonaparté however, in undisguised violation (not only of the rights of others, but of those *he himself* had acknowledged, and of that treaty to which he exacted Austria's implicit adherence) marched a French army into the country, and has there established a motley administration of his own making, which he calls a constitution. This part of his own code of public law was intricate and entangled: the military legislator unravelled it, as Alexander did the Gordian knot.

Our ministers thought they saw *something* more warlike and jacobinical than they had expected. Disappointed in not seeing Buonaparté's nature softened by the allurements of reviving commerce, and his brow smoothed into sleek complaisance *behind a counter* *, they again discovered "that gigantic and hideous ambition which would revolutionize all nations, and render all people tributary to France, †" "they thought the cause of Switzerland, the common cause of every power that is not a voluntary slave to the influence of France," † they boldly *resolved* to assert the independence of Europe by defending that of Switzerland, and with the shield of Britannia to protect the cradle of liberty.—And what did they *do*?—they sent Mr. Moore post haste to Constance, and he returned by easy journeys.—Notwithstanding this, however, Switzerland was subdued.

Now, Sir, is Mr. Moore about to make another trip to the Continent?—What new exploits are we to look for from the vigour of ministerial councils?—It is impossible to foresee, but we may perhaps guess, *ex pede Herculem*.

Having discussed their vigour, let us proceed to the next ground of confidence, the abilities they have hitherto displayed.

But these men concluded the peace of Amiens, the cause of our present embarrassed situation, that treaty, which, to borrow the beautiful language of Mr. Canning, has left the country in a slumber, that does not recruit her strength, but harasses her imagination with terrific dreams; that treaty which its authors themselves have now found to be fraught only with war, and which by the present message they have virtually avowed to be destitute of the only merit it ever claimed to procure repose.—

* See Mr. Sheridan's Speech on the Peace.

† True Briton, Oct. 14, 1802.

" of my sovereign's crown; and as a gen-
" tleman, I dare not dishonour a nobleman
" who wears my name and your Majesty's
" uniform."

The late king of Prussia said to an English gentleman of our acquaintance—"you " (meaning the British nation) are now " making a last effort to subsidize Europe " to fight with France, until you secure to " yourselves, a monopoly of the trade of " the world; should you succeed, you will " then soon make us repay your subsidies " with usury."—Whatever the people of England may be told to the contrary, we can, from a personal knowledge of facts, affirm, that this doctrine is believed in every cabinet and by every political economist on the continent of Europe. The present dependent state and *certain* subjugation of Portugal, the ruin and conquest of Holland, and the degradation of Spain, with a thousand circumstances of a similar nature, are artfully laid to our charge; and all the little scurrilous predictions, of our decline, that issues from the numerous presses now in all countries devoted to the cause of our enemies, are read and heard with avidity and pleasure by the people of all ranks and professions. "Let those fools read them," say our English politicians, "what is that to us." Did we not know the end purposed, and see the effects daily produced, by the newspaper-statements and comparative views circulated by the secretaries, clerks, and emissaries of the Consulate, we might perhaps join in the chorus with our *dotard* countrymen. But we see in those productions, the advertisements and *programme* of the most formidable combination that ever was planned against an empire. And, although we know that it will not be believed, conviction compels us to affirm, that Buonaparté's pamphlets and pensions, have more effect in confirming the several states of Europe in their enmity towards Great Britain, than all the subsidies the British treasury can ever pay, will have in conciliating their friendship. Subsidies are, no doubt, considerations to the agents and commissaries employed in paying and receiving them, and they may have a certain momentary value with the mistress of a prince, or a minister; but they never were, nor will they ever be, a national consideration to any state. The spoils of the British empire are, on the contrary, objects of the most seducing nature; scattered as they are, they suit the interests and ambition of many speculators; and the Consul's liberality will, perhaps, increase, as he augments his means.—We do not mean to infer, that Great Britain has any imminent danger to apprehend from the organized enmity of Europe; but as that enmity can in no wise, promote the interests of England, but, on the contrary, may prove more or less detrimental to them, we think it might be as well to prevent its organization; especially as that could yet be done with much facility, and to the great and permanent advantages of the British empire.

Dissertations will be periodically circulated on the continent to shew, that the trade and manufactures of Great Britain are ruinous to all other countries; that for these hundred years past, the maritime preponderance of England has hung like a mill stone upon the neck of Europe and America; and that her politics have ruined all those states with whom she has been connected.

Other essays will be distributed amongst the people of England, setting forth, that the national debt is a burden laid on the poor, merely to augment the wealth of the rich; that is the cause of all the taxes and of the high price of provisions; that if it were abolished, porter would be sold at twopence the pot, and bread at three pence the quarter-loaf; and it will be demonstrated, by metaphysical sophistry, that to pay the debts of generations past, and to fulfil the engagements of transient ministers, is no part of the duty of freemen. *To this will be added, a parallel drawn between the present state and future prospects of Great Britain and France:* wherein will be set forth,—the one, as having in 1762 passed the meridian of her power; in 1782 lost one half of the sources of her maritime trade; and as having in 1802 given up, or exposed the other half to the discretion of France; as possessing but a precarious revenue, to be pressed out of an equally precarious commerce; subject to an enormous expenditure, which may be augmented, or doubled by a single gesture of the first Consul; in fine, as a state now reduced, despised, by the greater powers and hated by the lesser. Whereas,—France will be represented, as having by the revolution increased her European territory by one-4th; abolished her debt, doubled her revenue, tripled her power; and as having acquired more real sources of maritime trade than all Europe possesses besides; as being now at the head of the political world, dictating to the most powerful states and protecting the weaker. In short, Great Britain will be, we may say is already, and with but too much truth, held up as being on a rapid decline; with her remaining powers resting merely upon paper, ships, wet-docks, and canals; while the republic is cried up as having built her growing prosperity and fu-

ture grandeur upon solid acquisitions of territory, produce, and population *.

Such are, and will continue to be, the means, by which the rulers of France will endeavour to embarrass the finances, fatigue the government, and depress the spirit of the British nation. *The inveterate enmity of those rulers can never be removed*; for unless Great Britain be reduced to *a passive inferiority, they cannot consider their republic as consolidated or secure.*

It is said, and industriously propagated, that Buonaparté having established his authority in France, it is become *his personal interest* to cultivate *a pacific understanding with all his neighbours.* And that, as he is now capable of maintaining ties of political relationship with other powers, it is *their interests to support his authority.*

This reasoning has no doubt originated with the Consul's confessor, bishop Talleyrand. That it should have gained admittance and approbation in the councils of Europe and America, seems to be owing to the baneful influence, of that hideous genius, which jacobinism and rebellion have set loose upon mankind. The fact is,—when Buonaparté signified his desire for peace, his authority *was not established*; his situation, as well as that of the republic, was, as we have mentioned, extremely critical; he sought peace with his neighbours, that he might have time to establish his authority, and to save the republic from what he considered, and what might have easily been brought about, its almost certain destruction. The Consul foresaw the effects which the conquest of Egypt was to produce both in England and France; he saw the still greater effects, which, Great Britain holding the destiny of the Turkish empire in her hand, might then have produced at Petersburgh; and he knew that in America, a single word to the purpose would have obligod president Jefferson to change his system, or his place, and might have barred France, for ever, from that side of the Atlantic; nor could he consider Portugal an equivalent for Brasil. Besides, the arms of both Portugal and Spain might have been turned against him *. Under these circumstances was peace obtained, and it is no wonder Buonaparté should wish to preserve it; at least until he acquire the means to command peace, or to defy war. When he believes himself in that situation, we shall see how far, and upon what terms, he is disposed to maintain his pacific relationship with his neighbours. Buonaparté has great advantages over his contemporaries. He was brought up in the world, and in active life. Beginning his career as a subaltern, his profession obliged him to think; and the habit of thinking no doubt taught him to calculate. The revolution enabled him to see men of all descriptions exposed without disguise; and now consul, he easily sees through the masks of those who have the vanity or folly to attempt to deceive him. This adventurer is in possession of absolute power, has the means to make that power irresistible, and has experience at an early period of life. He is the patron and protector of all sorts of principles, professions and prejudices; and is himself bound by none.—Amongst the absurdities of the times, it is not one of the least, to hear the legislators of Great Britain propping up the power of the British empire by the discontent and broils which they foresee generating in France, and with the jealousy which the politics of the republic is said to be raising amongst other continental governments. The obstinacy of infatuation is astonishing! Should the people of France be angry with the man who snatched their country from the precipice of inevitable

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* The present state and future prospects of Great Britain and France compared, is, according to Parisian news, to be exposed to the public by a well known disciple of Abbé Sieyes. This arch emissary, had some of his materials arranged and presented to the K—— of —— by colonel C—— at Berlin already in 1798. Having seen the manuscripts, we recollect, that to deliver the industry of Europe from the oppression of our *chapman laws*, as they were termed, was strongly recommended to the humanity of that young monarch. No doubt the heavy debts of our Jamaica planters, and the restrictions under which European settlers labour in Bengal, have by this time moved the compassion of this philanthropic Jacobin; and we shall very soon see, a plan drawn up, according to which, the former may pay off their burdens by an act of the assembly of the island, and the latter by a similar deed, may re-assume their natural freedom of trading with whom they please. It is not unlikely, that the First Consul may think proper to disapprove of this plan; but he will certainly permit its being made public; and Mr. —— is a supple negotiator; he has his secretaries *in more places than one.*

* In this position, the Consul knew, that to have adopted a certain system of politics (which may yet be necessary when it will be more difficult to carry it into practice) the British government, might, in the space of six months after the surrender of Alexandria, have drawn forth into action, all the power of Austria, Russia, America, and Spain, against the republic; not to fight for subsidy, nor for the commercial interests of Great Britain, but to fight for their own interests. It may be said, that had Buonaparté felt himself in the predicament we have mentioned, he would not have been so haughty and imperious during the negotiation. The contempt with which the Consul seemed to treat the negotiation, and his arrogance upon that occasion, might be accounted for, by several reasons; but, that to mask his anxiety was one leading motive, is certain.

all the circumstances relative thereto were investigated, and had been reported on by a general officer, on whose judgment, discretion, and impartiality, his Royal Highness could place the most perfect reliance. After these previous steps, his Royal Highness judged it proper to make a detailed report of every circumstance which had come to his knowledge, to the King; the result of which I am now to communicate to you by his Royal Highness's command.—His Majesty is pleased to direct, that it shall be expressed to the 83d regiment, that the conduct of certain individuals of the corps has been such, as has brought disgrace on the regiment; and, both in a civil and military point of view, has incurred his Majesty's highest displeasure. His Majesty particularly laments, that certain officers of the regiment have been most scandalously deficient in that zeal, energy and activity, in the discharge of their duty, which the circumstances complained of so strongly demanded; and that instead of co-operating with the Commanding Officer, and assisting him in his endeavours to curb the licentiousness of the soldiers, they have rather endeavoured to prevent the discovery of the offenders, and by the remissness of their own conduct, have set an example of indiscipline, which has produced the exact effect which might be expected on the men.—His Majesty will not allow officers, so destitute of those feelings, which a due sense of what they owe to themselves, and a proper regard for the honour of their profession, ought to have inspired, to occupy situations of important command and respectability in the service, while others of approved talents and zeal are removed from the active duties of it. On this principle, his Majesty is pleased to direct, that Lieutenant-Colonel John Byrne Skerrett, and the Captains William Armstrong and Lewis Grant, of the 83d regiment, shall be immediately placed on half-pay.—The Commander in Chief directs, that you declare at the head of the 83d regiment, which is to be under arms on the occasion, these, his Majesty's commands; and you will take that opportunity of impressing the necessity of each individual exerting himself, in order to wipe off the stigma which the misconduct (it is to be hoped) of a few, has brought on the regiment. To the officers, it is particularly necessary, that you should address yourself; for it is by their endeavours, that the discipline of the regiment must be restored. In their station, each individual must be a benefit or a detriment to the service, and the Commander in Chief desires they may be most solemnly assured, that his Royal Highness considers it as much his indispensable duty, to recommend to his Majesty the removal from his service, of any (whatever their rank may be), who fall under the latter description, as it is his inclination to promote the interests and welfare of those, whose conduct is calculated to support the discipline of the regiment, and to entitle them to the favour and protection of their sovereign.—It is his Royal Highness's command, that Lieutenant-Colonel Skerrett, and the Captains Armstrong and Grant, shall immediately quit the quarters of the 83d regiment.—I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed)—Harry Calvert, Adjutant General.

Lieutenant-General James Balfour, or Officer commanding the 83d regiment.

SIR THOMAS TROUBRIDGE.—*To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle.*—Sir,—A most malicious and unfounded report having been propagated that Sir Thomas Troubridge, availing himself of the knowledge derived from his official situation, had directed the sale of his stock from the funds on Monday and Tuesday last, I deem it incumbent upon me, as the actor in the business transacted, to put the public in possession of the whole fact.—Having had the honour of managing all his concerns for these twelve years past, he, about two months ago, informed me he should, in all probability, want his money in March or April, as he had in view the purchase of an estate, and he therefore desired me to watch the progress of the funds, and to sell his stock if I saw them falling, that he might not be put to inconvenience and loss at the time it might be wanted; and I was not to wait for further, or particular directions, but to use my own discretion.—Under these circumstances, I observed the funds drooping on the Saturday preceding, and on the Monday following having attended at the Bank, and seeing them still falling, and very large sums selling out, I deemed it a duty I owed my employer to order my broker to sell out Sir Thomas Troubridge's stock, and which was accordingly done without my having had any communication with him, either directly or indirectly, until the transaction was over.—I have made oath to the truth of the above declaration, which is stuck up at the Stock Exchange.—I am, Sir, &c.—*William Ely Cooke.*

Hart-Street, Bloomsbury, March 14.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES, *from p.* 429.

Tuesday, March 15.—COMMONS.—Mr. Dickenson, Jun. brought up a report from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Herefordshire election, stating that J. G. Cotterell, Esq. was not duly elected, but that Sir J. Cornwall was duly elected, and that the petition was not frivolous nor vexatious. A new writ was then ordered to be issued for the election of a member in the room of the former.—Report of the Grand Junction Canal was brought up and agreed to.—Irish Customs Bill read a third time and passed.—Bill for making a provision for the wives and children of militia men of Ireland called out upon actual service, read a first time.

Wednesday, March 16.—LORDS.—Prince of Wales' Annuity Bill read a third time and passed.—Irish Post-Office Duty Bill read a third time and ordered back to the Committee.

COMMONS.—Sir M. Ridley moved the order of the day for calling John Hall, guilty of prevarication and perjury in his evidence before the Great Grimsby Committee, to the bar of the House. He was brought to the bar accordingly, and after being reprimanded by the Speaker, ordered to be discharged on paying his fees.—Mr. H. Browne reported, from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the petitions complaining of an undue election for the town and county of the town of Nottingham, that the said Committee had determined that Joseph Birch, Esq. was not duly elected to serve in Parliament for the said town; also that D. P. Coke, Esq. was not duly elected; also that last election was void with respect to one of the burgesses; also that not any, nor either of the petitions were frivolous nor vexatious; and that the opposition of Joseph Birch, Esq. was not frivolous nor vexatious. Mr. H. Browne reported likewise the several resolutions agreed to by that Committee. The report was ordered for further consideration on the 20th of April.—Mr. H. Browne then moved, that no writ be issued for the election of a burgess for Nottingham, until after the consideration of the re-

port. Agreed to.—Captain Markham moved, "that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the conduct of Sir Thomas Trowbridge, relative to certain transactions which were reported to have taken place on the Stock Exchange." A short debate ensued, which will be preserved in our *Supplement*; but as the motion was not seconded, the business, of course, fell to the ground. —The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the nature and extent of the charges on the Civil List, and to consider of the best means of preventing the accumulation of debt on it."—On the motion for the first reading of the Irish Militia Bill, a debate ensued, which will be given in our *Supplement*. Bill read a first time.—Militia Law Consolidating Bill read a second time.—Irish Bank Restriction Bill and Irish Militia Families Provision Bill read a first time.

Thursday, March 17.—LORDS.—Insolvent Debtor's Bill, and Irish Chalking Act read a second time.

COMMONS.—The House proceeded to ballot for a Committee to try the merits of the election for the borough of Ilchester, and also for East Grinstead.—Irish Militia Bill read a second time.—The Grenada and St. Vincent Loan Bill read a second time.—Fred. Shuttleworth was brought in and reprimanded by the Speaker, for having prevaricated in his evidence before the Nottingham Committee. Mr. Addington moved, that the Speaker's address be entered on the Journals of the House. Agreed *nem. con.*—Bank Restriction Bill read a second time.—Dublin Watch Bill read a third time.

Friday, March 18.—LORDS.—Counsel were heard relative to the Scotch Appeal, Crauford and others, *v.* Coutts.—The report of the Committee of Privileges, relative to the promotion of Lord Viscount Limerick to an earldom was taken into consideration, and the patent creating his lordship an earl of that part of the United Kingdom was read; after which his lordship was conducted to the Earl's Bench, where he took his seat.—The Earl of Carlisle gave notice, that it was his intention to bring forward a motion on an early day, respecting the artificers of his Majesty's Dock Yards. His Lordship's speech on the occasion will be preserved in our *Supplement*.

COMMONS.—Sir M. W. Ridley reported from the Great Grimsby Committee, that J. H. Loft was not duly elected, and that W. Mellish ought to have been elected, and, therefore, he is duly elected. The Deputy Clerk of the Crown was then called in, and the return for Great Grimsby altered in conformity to the report.—Sir M. W. Ridley brought up another report from the same Committee, stating that John Simpson, Mayor of Great Grimsby, had, on the day before the election, held a full Court, and had unlawfully, and of his own authority, admitted persons as Freemen, who ought not to have been admitted, &c. Report ordered to be taken into consideration on the 29th inst.—Bill for suspending the Act of Henry VIII. relative to Clergymen read a first time.—Militia Officers Bill read a second time. The debate which took place on this occasion, will be given in our *Supplement*.—Mr. Johnstone moved, "that the receipts and disbursements relative to the Island of Ceylon, be laid before the house." Ordered.—Post-Office Bill read a first and second time.—Expiring Laws Bill, and Irish Lawsuit Bill read a third time and passed.

Monday, March 21.—LORDS.—Counsel were further heard relative to the Scotch Appeal, Crawfurd *v.* Coutts.—The Earl of Carlisle moved, "that the proper officers do lay before this House, a monthly return of all the artificers employed in his Majesty's Dock Yards, from the month of May 1802, to the present period." After a debate of some length, which will be given in our *Supplement*, the motion was withdrawn.

COMMONS.—Mr. Burdon moved, "that a Committee be appointed to inquire into so much of the Election Trial Bill, as relates to the employment of persons skilled in the art of writing Short Hand, to take the evidence adduced before such Committees; that they do consider of the expense occasioned thereby, and the means by which they shall be paid; and that they do report the same to the House." Ordered.—Clergy Non-residence Bill read a second time.—Report of the Committee on East-India Accounts was taken into further consideration, and, after a short debate, for which see our *Supplement*, the resolutions were all read and agreed to.—Irish Postage Bill read a third time and passed.

Tuesday, March 22.—LORDS.—Bill to prevent vexatious Suits in Ireland read a second time.—Irish Postage Duty Bill brought up from the Committee.

COMMONS.—Lord Euston informed the House, that James Trotter, who had been ordered into custody, in consequence of a report from the Dumfirmline Select Committee, and after whom the Serjeant at Arms had been desired to make further enquiry, had yesterday surrendered himself, and was now in the custody of the Serjeant at Arms, to await the decision of that House.—The Bill for allowing Vessels employed in the Greenland Trade to take in their full complement of men at certain ports, during the present season, was read a first time.—In a Committee on the Militia Officer's Bill, the resolutions were agreed to, and the report ordered to be brought up, (*see Supplement*).—Mr. Tierney moved, "that there be laid before the House an account of the Increase and Decrease in the Salaries of all Public Officers for 1802." Ordered.—Grenada Loan Bill read a second time.—Irish Bank Restriction Bill read a third time and passed.

Wednesday, March 23.—LORDS.—Paddington Canal Bill read a third time.—Irish Bank Restriction Bill read a first time.

COMMONS.—A new writ was ordered for Brackley, in the room of General Egerton, who has succeeded to the title of Earl of Bridgewater.—Alderman Anderson moved for leave to bring in a Bill for constructing a new Burying Ground in the parish of St. Giles's, Leave granted.—Greenland Whale Fishery Bill read a second time.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of Supply; and that the account of grants for Great Britain, presented to the House on the 23d of February, should be referred to the said Committee.—Ordered.—He then stated, that the sums which he proposed to move should be granted to his Majesty, would amount, altogether, to 920,000l. of which 868,000l. would be for the discharge of Exchequer Bills, issued in pursuance of the acts of the 39th, 40th, 41st, and 42d, of his present Majesty.—The following Resolutions were then moved and agreed to:—868,923l. 8s. 1d. for the discharge of the Exchequer Bills above described.—1910l. 10s. to make good money advanced to the Commissioners for reducing the National Debt, for the payment of salaries to their officers, and other incidental expences.—500l. for extra trouble to the officers employed in making out Exchequer Bills,

thing that depends on him to prevent disturbances, or any act which might disturb the public peace in the district where the troops may be stationed.—Remark. Their Excellencies will most cordially concur in carrying into effect the object of this article.—Art. VIII. To ensure the subsistence of the troops of the two nations, the Lieutenant-Governor shall in no manner hinder the supply of the Batavian troops, as the Commissary-General of the Batavian Republic, on his part, will in no way interfere or prevent supplies from the interior going into Cape Town.—Remark. Agreed to in the terms of the preceding article.—Art. IX. None of these arrangements shall be interpreted at any time against the Batavian Republic, or against the Commissary-General, as abandoning in any shape the clear right that the peace of Amiens has given them to the cession of this colony.—Remark. Certainly not.—Art. X. Sending detachments to hinder any disturbances in the neighbourhood of the camp, or to constrain the Hottentots, as well as for the escort of provisions, either to the Batavian Camp or to Cape Town, shall not be considered as moving the troops from the position fixed upon. The Batavian troops shall not return to Cape Town during this agreement, neither shall the English troops take up any position out of the castle or forts, which can molest the Batavian camp in any manner.—Remark. Agreed to, provided such disturbances either threaten or have actually taken place, and that the safe-guards for waggons, &c. do not exceed what is usual for such purposes.—Art. XI. In case of any doubts or difficulties arising concerning the true meaning of the present agreement, they shall be explained in the most advantageous manner for carrying into effect the salutary motives which have induced their Excellencies and the Commissary-General of the Batavian Republic to enter into it; and more especially for ensuring to the Commissary-General, the Governor and General in Chief, and the officers civil and military, the greatest security, liberty and independence. The whole in order to cement more strongly the good intelligence so happily established between their Excellencies and the Commissary General of the Batavian Republic.—Remark. Fully agreed to.

Government Proclamation.—By his Honour Lieutenant-General Francis Dundas, Colonel of his Majesty's Scotch Brigade, Governor, Acting Governor, and Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Castle, Town, and Settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, in South Africa, and of the Territories and Dependencies thereof, and Ordinary and Vice-Admiral of the same.

Whereas the circumstances that have lately occurred might excite in the breasts of the ill-disposed part of the community, opinions and designs prejudicial to the public welfare and repose; and whereas any attempts originating from such opinions and designs to interrupt the public peace, can have no other effect than to produce disorder and confusion, misery and ruin; the destruction of families, and a general desolation in the country: in order to prevent, as far as possible, such direful consequences, I do hereby prohibit, in the most positive manner, on pain of prompt execution of military law, which by virtue of powers in me vested, I do hereby proclaim, all assemblages of armed peasants, or other inhabitants of any description whatsoever, unless by my authority and commands, conveyed in the usual manner to the Landrosts or other officers properly qualified to issue the same. And all the inhabitants of this settlement, bound by the oath of allegiance they have taken to his Britannic Majesty, are hereby warned of the fatal consequences that must inevitably ensue to themselves, their families, and property, by any deviation from this public order, it being my positive resolution to enforce a strict and literal obedience to the same.—And whereas it is expedient, during the present state of the settlement, that the inhabitants in general, both of Cape Town and the country districts, should not be permitted to quit their habitations, I do further forbid all persons residing in this town from leaving the same with their families, for the purpose of changing their places of abode, without my special leave and authority; and those of the country districts without the knowledge and approbation of the respective Landrosts and Heemraaden.—Given under my hand and seal at the castle of Good Hope, this 2d day of January, 1803.—(Signed) *Francis Dundas.*

By command of his Honour the Lieutenant and acting Governor.—*A. Barnard, Sec.*

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

*Napper Tandy's Second Letter to Mr. Elliot.—**For the First see p.* 361.

Sir—Eight weeks have passed since I wrote to you. My request has been neither accepted nor even acknowledged. I now appeal to the public for my revenge against your attack. Had the condition of my unfortunate country been the subject of the debate, there might have been room perhaps for allusions to my name; but that was not the case. The debate was respecting a tax to be imposed on Great Britain, in which, I as citizen of France, could be, upon no fair pretence, brought in. The baseness of such conduct must be striking to the whole world. A brave man would never attack the defenceless nor the absent. In my letter I scrupulously avoided all retort against you. I used no expression that could hurt the feelings of a man of honour, though in so doing I might have been justified by your example. I simply made that appeal, to which every man has a right, when his honour is injured. But since you take your stand behind certain indefinite privileges, behind the extravagant idea, that a member of the British Parliament.————I am now forced to declare, after this explanation of your conduct, that Mr. Elliot is —— (The words here made use of we shall not insert.)

(Signed) NAPPER TANDY.

Decree of the Captain-General and Colonial Prefect of Martinico, relative to the Duties on French and Foreign Merchandize, issued the 1st Jan. 1803.

French merchandize shall pay no import nor export duty.—Foreign vessels shall pay an import duty of two per cent. on the value of their cargo.—Foreign vessels clearing outwards with a lading of rum and molasses shall pay a duty of two per cent. *ad valorem.*—Foreign vessels entering with a cargo, and departing in ballast shall pay 9 per cent. on the value of their imports.—Such of the said vessels as sail without a complete cargo, or with one not equal in value to the cargo imported, shall pay 9 per cent. on such part of the proceeds as shall not be laid out in the purchase of colonial produce.—Spanish vessels are exempted from all import and export duties.

Decree of the Batavian Legislature, relative to the mode of the Repayment of the Batavian Rescriptions, payable after the Peace.

The Legislative Body of the Batavian Republic having deliberated on the Message of the Government, dated 11th Feb. 1803, has thought proper, in conformity with the proposition contained in the said Message, to authorise the Government, 1st, to consider as void, the 5th article of the law of the 14th of Jan. last, according to which the Batavian rescriptions, payable after the peace, which should not have been negotiated away before the 22d of Sept. this year, should be converted into national debt not payable; 2d, to offer the holders of these rescriptions, who wish to vest them in the voluntary loan, the same terms which are offered to the holders of India Stock, comprising the following advantages, viz. for 1000 florins in Rescriptions or India Stock, and 800 florins in cash. 3000 florins in National Obligations, producing 3 per cent. perpetual interest. Also a receipt for 50 florins, in addition to which 150 florins in cash will procure a share of 400 florins in the loan to be raised by lottery according to the plan annexed to the voluntary loan of 1802; these shares to be converted into a national debt, bearing interest of 2½ per cent.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Copy of a Letter addressed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, to the Lord Lieutenants of the Maritime Counties in Great Britain.—Whitehall, 9th March, 1803.

My Lord,—As there is reason to think that aliens landing in this kingdom from the continent, neglect in many instances to make their declarations to the magistrates of the places where they reside, as required by the provisions of the 9th and 10th clauses of the Alien Act, a copy of which I inclose, I am to request that your Lordship will be so good as to call the particular attention of the magistrates in the county of to this circumstace, and to desire them to enforce the provisions of the above-mentioned clauses, with respect to such aliens within their several jurisdictions, as have neglected to comply therewith, and at the same time to return to me a list of such aliens.—I am, &c.—*Pelham.*

The Lord Lieutenant of the county of

(Circular.)—Downing-Street, March 1803.—I have the honour to herewith his Majesty's warrant, directing to draw out and embody the Militia of the county of and I have received his Majesty's commands, to desire that will take the necessary steps for carrying this measure into execution with the least possible delay.—I am further to desire that will cause the earliest communication of the day and place which may be appointed for the assembling of the Militia of the county of to be made to the Secretary at War, in order that directions may be given for the issue of the pay of the men, and that such other arrangements may be made, on this occasion, as more immediately belong to his department.—I conclude that the intimation conveyed in the Secretary of War's circular letter, of the 6th of November last, to the several commanding officers of Militia, respecting the arms and accoutrements for the different corps, has been duly attended to; but, in case the number necessary for the Militia should be incomplete, immediate application must be made to the Board of Ordnance for the quantity of arms, and to the War-Office respecting the accoutrements that are still deficient.—In the event of the Militia of the county of not being complete, I am directed by his Majesty to recommend, that the most decisive measures should be taken for supplying the deficiencies, and for enforcing the several provisions of the Act. —I have the honour to be, &c.—*Hobart.*

To his Majesty's Lieutenant of the County of

To Officers on Half-Pay.—War-Office, March 12, 1803.—All officers on the half-pay of the land forces, resident in Great Britain and Ireland, who are not serving in the militia, or who do not hold offices under Government, are hereby required immediately to transmit to the inspecting field officers of the recruiting districts, within which they respectively reside, an account in writing of their age, past services, and present place of abode, in order that their services may be called for as circumstances shall render it expedient: And such as think themselves, from age or infirmities, unfit for further service, even in this country, are to accompany their reports with sufficient vouchers of their inability, and the causes thereof Such officers on half-pay as are serving in the militia, or are otherwise employed under Government, (officers of the yeomanry and volunteer corps excepted, whose reports are to be made to the inspecting field officers of districts as abovementioned), are to transmit similar accounts to the Secretary at War, specifying also the nature of the public situations which they possess.—The inspecting field officers of districts will make returns to the Secretary at War of the names of the officers who shall report themselves in pursuance of the above notice. And every officer who shall neglect to make his report, either to a district field officer, or to the Secretary at War, according to the circumstances of his situation, within one month from the date hereof, will be considered as otherwise provided for, or dead, and his name will be struck off the half-pay list accordingly.—By his Majesty's command,—*C. York.*

General Orders.—Horse-Guards, March 12, 1803.—It is the King's pleasure that, notwithstanding any leave of absence granted by his Majesty, or by the Commander in Chief, all officers belonging to regiments in Great Britain, or on foreign stations, do join their respective corps without delay, except such officers as are employed on the recruiting service, or upon any public duty.—By order of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief,

Harry Calvert, Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

General Orders.—Horse Guards, March 18, 1803.—It is the Commander in Chief's pleasure, that the enclosed copy of a letter to the colonel of the 83d regiment shall be read at the head of every regiment in the service, and entered in the regimental orderly books.—By his Royal Highness's command,—Harry Calvert, Adjutant-General.

(Copy.)—Horse Guards, March 18, 1803.—Sir,—I am directed by the Commander in Chief to express to you, the extreme concern with which his Royal Highness received the representations made by certain magistrates of the county of Essex, of the enormities which have been lately committed in the vicinity of Chelmsford, by the regiment under your command. Though his Royal Highness entertained, in his own mind, little doubt as to the cause to which these disgraceful instances of indiscipline were to be attributed, he avoided giving any opinion on the subject, till

all Europe, perishing by a war, as inveterate as it was unreasonable?—For the better understanding of this message, we think it will be sufficient to translate it into other words. What would be said of the French Government, if it transmitted the following message to the Legislative Body?—Government deems it necessary to inform the Legislative Body that, as the British Government does not burn at least one-half of its navy; that as a certain degree of bustle prevails in the British ports, arsenals and dock yards;—and because it does not execute the treaties, &c. it judges it to be prudent to adopt measures of precaution for the safety of the State, &c.—There is certainly no difference between calling for the reduction of an existing force, or pretending to prevent the creation of a necessary force; but there would be a difference with respect to the Governments which would hold such language, and France might allege motives, which would not, perhaps, meet the approbation of the British Government, for we might repeat, it was the French who wished for, and who actually made and commanded peace; it was you, British Government, that wished for war—it is you then who are to be suspected, and who are calculated to awaken alarm.—England is borne down by an enormous debt, and she wishes to make us pay the interest of it, as well as the capital, by the means of a treaty of commerce, drawn up in a certain way—It is very good natured of her to make dupes of us! We think, however, that if Europe has no right to consider us as cowards, she can aduce no reasons to prove us to be fools. After having conquered with our arms; after having negotiated with equal ability, foresight, magnanimity, and resolution, it must be supposed that a Government which was capable of such achievements, would have greatly degenerated, if it consented at once to pay, indirectly, the expenses of the war which was waged against us, and to furnish the means of renewing it!—The period must come when Governments, as well as individuals, will do each other justice, and consent, through their own exertions, to extricate themselves from their embarrassment, however great, and into which their own imprudence plunged them, under pain of falling into a worse and more unenviable predicament.

On England.

From the Paris Journal, called the "Journal des Débats," of March 19, 1803.

England has created two singular privileges for itself: the first, in considering the commerce of the whole world as its exclusive property; the second, in indulging itself in the boldest discussions on the conduct of all governments, and in treating them with an insolence of language often insufferable. All the nations of Europe have been grossly insulted in the debates of the English Parliament since the treaty of Amiens. No person can deny this assertion, which is proved by the public journals. By virtue of the first privilege, England never patiently suffers any nation to extend its commerce; by the second, it considers the slightest observations of other governments on their privileges, as an attack upon its dignity; its pride is even offended when its own declarations are repeated by any other nation. It is in these two assumed privileges, and in their consequences, that the cause of the present extraordinary conduct of the British Minister must be sought; for it is impossible that any thing new could have occurred in the negotiations.—Let us take a review, in a few words, of what has passed since the meeting of Parliament. In his speech, on opening the session, the King did not affirm that his conduct towards France should be regulated according to the treaty of Amiens, but by the situation of Europe. This was to announce clearly, that the treaty (of which his Majesty took no notice) either should or should not be executed, according to circumstances.—The party, which disapproved of the peace, in the midst of the most indecorous charges on France, loudly demanded the non-execution of the treaty, in censuring the ministers for having concluded it. Have the ministers denied the possibility of a renewal of hostilities, and the disgraceful idea of a violation of the faith of treaties? No; they justified the peace with timidity; they claimed thanks for having concluded it; and they positively declared, that they would take the first favourable opportunity of renewing the war. Lord Hawkesbury urged no objection against war, but the danger of undertaking it without continental alliances; no member of administration objected that the national honour was pledged to the fulfilment of treaties; and the minister himself, at length avowing that he hesitated between peace and war, has demanded an establishment bordering upon both; that is to say double the peace establishment. Such has been the conduct of England since the treaty of Amiens; and it may be asserted upon good grounds, that the part in that country most inclined to peace, was that, which wished to gain time to sound the dispositions of the powers of Europe before they appealed to arms.—The French government has not uttered a complaint, but, leaving wholly to the English the liberty of discussing a treaty, which all parties had originally approved of, has confined itself to the cordial execution of the articles agreed on.—Three months after the opening of the English Parliament, the session of the Legislative Body commenced in France: the government presented a review of the situation of the Republic; and, according to custom, published to the nation the state of its relations. As the whole world saw and was acquainted with it, it was unavoidable to say, that the contending parties of England left the question of peace or war in the same uncertainty; and that Malta had not been evacuated, though it ought three months after the signing of the treaty. This public fact was mentioned with all the decorum which nations owe each other, even in their differences; and all that regarded England in the review of the situation of France, was so far from any hostile disposition, that it concluded with the following sentence: "Yes, no doubt, peace will "every day be more consolidated; the relations of "the two governments will assume that character "of benevolence which accords with their recipro-"cal interests. A happy repose will obliterate the "long calamities of a disastrous war; and both "France and England, in promoting their mutual "happiness, will deserve the gratitude of the whole "world."—The French, who all remember how many prospects of peace and happiness the review of the situation of France presented by the government gave rise to, will scarcely believe that it could become, with respect to England, an appeal to oppression, to invasion, and to arms.—We well know that the state of our finances has struck the English with astonishment; they have not known France since they regarded it but with animosity, whilst

we know England better than ever, because we view it without jealousy, as well as without admiration. We know also, that the revival of our commerce, the activity which the First Magistrate imparts to the nation, our mutual confidence, the prodigious effects of a single year of peace, must be displeasing to the English nation; but the sentiments of envy so natural to every people, exclusively commercial, cannot sufficiently explain the conduct of the English minister. "What is it then in the review of the situation of our country that could give him so much annoyance?" Could it be this expression—"The maritime peace is the want and desire of all nations; to preserve that, the government will do every thing compatible with the national honour essentially connected with the rigid execution of treaties?"—To demand the rigid execution of treaties, and to make that the foundation of national honour, is this to be guilty of blasphemy? Is this to threaten war? Is it not rather according to the consent of all nations to speak in favour of morality, of true policy, and of peace? and must not England have seriously determined beforehand to fail in the execution of treaties, thus livelily to be alarmed at a demand of the rigid execution of them? In case even that political motives should induce the French government to modify with good will the articles of any treaty whatsoever, so far as it saw no necessity for them, so far as it had not accepted any compensation; in a word, so far as it had come to no positive or publicly declared resolution; is it not its duty in addressing itself to France to make the rigid execution of known treaties the basis of national honour? In fact, it is only in the English Parliament, that the safety of the state and the national honour can be supported on contrary principles; but it was chiefly within the last year, that the falsest principles of politics became so prevalent in England, that a minister was heard to affirm, in a full house, even at the time he acknowledged the want of continental alliances—"It is true, war on the Continent is often unsuccessful to our allies, but it is always advantageous to us."—The English minister, who had till then been content to apologise for the peace, which he concluded with the approbation of the whole nation, takes advantage of a very innocent phrase, addressed by the head of the French government to the French people. Every thing is carried on with such rapidity, that the King is scarcely allowed time to return to London to subscribe the message, on a project of invasion, which existed only in the heads of those who desired to excite an alarm in England, which they felt not themselves. The English must have very soon lost the practice of watching the ports of France, to be ignorant that there was neither completed, nor preparing, any hostile armament in them.—This message, succeeded by a demand of 10,000 seamen, in addition to the 50,000 already granted by Parliament, was produced with such precipitancy, that the public funds fell 15 per cent.; a circumstance unexampled in England, without parallel in any country under an able minister, because, the art of government consists in avoiding the shock, whenever so great an alarm as the formidable possibility of war is given; it apprises the holders of stock; it avails itself, in support of the public credit, of the numberless means that are always in its power, and it succeeds in regulating the motions of the public funds. In a country, where, as in England, the finances depend entirely on opinion, it does much more injury to lower the funds 15 per cent. than the certainty of the pretended armaments in the ports of France and Holland could. What will be the issue of such inexplicable conduct? It would be difficult to decide.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Cape of Good Hope.—Articles of Agreement—Concluded this 31st Day of December, 1802, between Colonel Hamilton, Deputy Quarter Master General, and John Pringle, Esq. Commissary-General, duly authorized for that purpose by their Excellencies Lieutenant-General Dundas, and Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, Bart. on the part of his Britannic Majesty; and Rear Admiral S. Dekker, Commander in Chief of the Batavian Fleet for the East Indies; and Colonel Henry, Commander of the Cape Garrison, also duly authorized by his Excellency the Commissary-General De Mist, on the part of the Batavian Republic.

Article I. Every thing shall be considered as remaining on the same footing that was stipulated by mutual assent this morning, before the arrival of the orders of his Britannic Majesty.—Remark. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees to this proposition, without any prejudice, however, to the full exercise of his authority in all points whatever, agreeable to the orders he has recived.—Art. II. The Commissary-General de Mist shall be at liberty to encamp or canton the Batavian troops in the neighbourhood of Cape Town, and to select for that purpose the most convenient position for the health, safety, and accommodation of these troops.—Remark. They shall encamp or canton in the neighbourhood of Wynberg, and it is to be understood that they are not to move from thence beyond the usual distance allowed in a camp, without the knowledge and concurrence of the Lieutenant-governor.—Art. III. Their Excellencies shall not hinder the free transport of baggage, arms, and every thing else necessary for encamping or cantoning the troops.—Remark. Agreed to, provided that not more than 8 field pieces (6 pounders) shall be carried to camp.—Art. IV. A free communication shall be allowed with the Batavian ships, whether of war or transport, now in the Bay, or which may arrive hereafter; and no impediment shall be made to the disembarkation of any troops that may still arrive, or to their arms, ammunition, and baggage.—Remark. Agreed to, in consequence of the orders received from his Britannic Majesty to avoid any possible step which could lead to even the apprehension of an hostile motive, but only in so far as relates to the troops intended for the garrison of the Cape.—Art. V. All Batavian ships, whether of war, transport, or commerce, shall have permission to prosecute their voyages, or to return to Europe, according to the orders they may have on this subject, and which the Commissary-General shall deem necessary to give them.—Remark. Agreed to.—Art. VI. In case his Excellency, Lieutenant-General Dundas, shall receive any orders from Europe relative to the present state of affairs, he shall communicate them to the Commissary-General; and in the event of these orders leading to acts of hostility, he engages to give the Commissary-General eight days previous notice, in order that he may take such measures, either for remaining in, or leaving this colony, with every person and thing under his orders, as be necessary, engaging himself to act reciprocally in this respect towards his excellency.—Remark. Agreed to, it being clearly understood, that the privilege of either staying in, or leaving, the colony, with every thing belonging to his Majesty or individuals, is equally left to the option of their Excellencies.—Art. VII. The only object of the present agreement being the maintenance of good order, the Commissary-General of the Batavian Republic promises to do every

—25,564l. 13s. 6d. to the Bank of England, for discount on the Loan of 1802; and 22,538l. 2s. 2d. to ditto, for receiving the contribution to ditto.—371l. 17s. to John Wilmott, Esq. for examination of certain American claims.—3600l. for certain incidental expenses for the last year.

The Master of the Rolls moved for leave to bring in a Bill to remove certain inconveniencies and disabilities to which the Catholics of Great Britain are at present subject, in consequence of two oaths prescribed by the Acts of the 18th and 31st. of his present Majesty.—Leave granted, and the Bill read a first time.—Irish Militia Bounty Bill read a third time and passed.—The Attorney General moved, "that leave be given to bring in a Bill for appointing commissioners to ascertain the individuals who had claims upon a certain fund of 600,000l. which, according to a convention of the year 1800, the American government had agreed to pay by installments; and to distribute the fund accordingly." Leave granted.—Report of the Militia Officers Bill brought up.—Upon the motion for the amendments being read, a short debate ensued, for which see Supplement. Amendments read and agreed to.

Thursday, March 24.—LORDS.—Royal Assent given by commission to about forty public and private Bills.—Irish postage Bill read a third time and passed.

COMMONS.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer presented the following

MESSAGE FROM HIS MAJESTY.

"G. R. His Majesty having taken into his serious consideration the many eminent services of Sir James Saumarez, Bart. K.B. Rear Admiral of the Blue, and particularly his engagement with the Spaniards in the Streights of Gibraltar, on the 12th July, 1801, has deemed it proper to communicate this his most gracious consideration to this House, in order that his most faithful Commons may take such steps as will enable his Majesty to reward such signal services, by the settlement of an annuity of 1200l. upon the said Sir James Saumarez for the term of his natural life. G. R."—The Chancellor of the Exchequer then moved that the above most gracious message be taken into consideration in a committee of the whole House to-morrow. Ordered.—St. Giles's Burying Ground Bill, Duke of Athol's Bridge Bill, and Southampton Water Works Bill read a first time.—Woolwich Trustee Bill read a second time.—Clergy Non Residence Bill read a third time and passed.

Friday, March 25.—LORDS.—Lord Pelham brought down a message from his Majesty similar to that delivered to the Commons yesterday, which, on his Lordship's motion, was ordered to be taken into consideration on Monday.—Royal assent given by commission, to the Irish Office-Duty Bill, and to some other public and private Bills.

COMMONS.—Mr. Mac Dowall moved for leave to bring in a Bill for erecting a Theatre in the town of Glasgow. Granted.—The petition of James Trotter, who had been summoned as a witness on the Dumfermline committee, was presented by Lord Euston. On the motion of the noble Lord, "that James Trotter be on Monday next brought to the Bar of that House and discharged," a conversation of considerable length succeeded, which turned upon a point of form by which the House might, with the greatest propriety, regulate their proceedings in this case. It will be preserved in our *Supplement*. It was then ordered, that James Trotter should be brought to the Bar of that House on Monday next.—In a committee of the whole House on his Majesty's most gracious message respecting Sir James Saumarez, the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "that it is the opinion of this committee, that the sum of 1200l. per annum, be granted out of the consolidated fund of Great Britain, to be settled on Rear Admiral Sir James Saumarez, for the term of his natural life." The question was then put, and carried unanimously.—In a committee of the whole House, to consider further of ways and means for raising the supply granted to his Majesty, the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "that it is the opinion of this committee, that towards raising a supply granted to his Majesty, the further sum of four millions be raised by loan in Exchequer Bills." Granted.—American Compensation Commissioners Bill read a second time, and committed for Monday.—Surveyor General of the Forests Office Bill read a third time and passed.—Report of Greenland Fishery Bill brought up and agreed to.

Monday, March 28.—LORDS.—Counsel were further heard relative to the important Scotch Appeal, Crawfurd *v.* Coutts.—Irish Chalking Bill read a first time.—Irish Militia Bounty Bill read a second time.

COMMONS.—A report was brought up from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Chippenham election, stating that Mr. Brooks was not duly elected, and that Mr. Maitland was duly elected. The Clerk of the Crown was then ordered to amend the return accordingly.—Glasgow Theatre Bill read a first time.—Stephen Brooks, who was guilty of prevarication before the Nottingham Committee, was brought to the bar of the House, and after a reprimand from the Speaker, discharged.—Greenland Whale Fishery Bill read a third time and passed.—Catholic Oath Bill read a second time.—On the order of the day being read for bringing James Trotter to the bar of the House, who had wilfully absented himself from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Dumfermline election; and the question being put "that James Trotter be now discharged on paying his fees," a debate of considerable length took place, which will be given in our *Supplement*. The motion was negatived, and the question was then put, "that so much of the minutes of the evidence given before the Dumfermline Committee as relates to James Trotter, be laid before the House." Ordered.—Mr. Addington moved, "that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the joint expenditure of the United Kingdom, from the 1st of Jan. 1801, to the 1st of Jan. 1803, and the sums contributed to the state of Great Britain and Ireland respectively." Ordered.—General Gascoyne moved, "that leave be given to bring in a bill to equalize by weight the bushel of all salt imported to Ireland." Motion withdrawn.—Militia Officer's Bill read a third time and passed.—Mr. Vansittart moved for an account of all rock and white salt exported from Great Britain for the three years ending the 5th Jan. 1793, and for the three years ending the 5th Jan. 1803. Ordered.

Tuesday, March 29.—LORDS.—Counsel heard on behalf of the claim of the Rev. E. Timewell Brydges, to the Barony of Chandos.—Clergy Non-residence Bill read a first time.

COMMONS.—Mr. J. Smyth brought up the report of the Committee appointed to try the merits of the election for the borough of Ilchester. It stated that W. Hunter, Esq. and T. Plummer, Esq. were not duly elected; that the petitioners, Sir

W. Manners, and J. Graham, Esq. were not duly elected; and that the election for the said borough was void. Mr. Smyth stated, that he was further directed by the Committee, to report, that such a system of corruption had been formed, and so many instances of individual bribery had been discovered previous to the election, that the Committee thought it necessary to communicate the same to the House: he concluded by moving, "that the minutes of the evidence taken before the Committee should be laid before the House." Ordered.—A new writ for Ilchester was ordered to be issued out.—Sir J. Saumarez's Annuity Bill, and Exchequer Loan Bill read a first time.—Clergy Non-residence Bill, and Woolwich Ordnance Bill read a third time and passed.

Wednesday, March 30.—LORDS.—Counsel finally heard relative to the Scotch Appeal, Crawfurd *v.* Coutts.—Clergy Non-residence Bill read a second time. The debate which took place on this occasion will be given in our *Supplement*.—A copy of the relevant proceedings in the Consistory Court of York being duly laid before the House, the bill to dissolve the marriage between the Rev. George Markham, and Susan his wife, was read a first time.

COMMONS.—The Speaker read a letter from Vice-Admiral Rainier, acknowledging the thanks of the House to him, and the officers under his command, and expressing his high gratification of the polite manner the Speaker had communicated the same.—A report was brought up from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Renfrew election, stating that Alexander Houston was not duly elected, and that Boyle Alexander was duly elected, and that none of the petitions were frivolous or vexatious. The Deputy Clerk was ordered to amend the return accordingly.—In a Committee of the whole House, on the Grenada Loan Bill, the blanks in the bill were filled up, and the period for paying the money is to extend from the 4th of October, to the 5th of March, 1804.—Roman Catholic Oath Bill read a second time.—A message from the Lords stated, that they had agreed to the Irish Militia Bill, without any amendment.—Sir James Saumarez's Annuity Bill, and Exchequer Loan Bill read a second time.

General Distribution of the British Army, APRIL 1, 1803.	Regulars. Cav.	Inf.	Tot Ba.
England and Wales	20	29	49
North Britain	2	4	6
Ireland	7	23	30
Jersey, Guernsey, &c.	—	5	5
Gibraltar	—	6	6
Egypt and Malta	—	8	8
Canada, Nova Scotia, &c.	—	4	4
West-Indies	—	23	23
Cape of Good Hope, Goree, &c.	—	5	5
East-Indies, and on Passage to	5	19	24
On Passage to England or Ireland	1	6	7
Total	53	132	167

The above statement is exclusive of artillery, engineers, artificers, and Militia.

FRENCH FUNDS.—March 16th, 58 fr. 50.—18th, 60 fr. 60.—19th, 59 fr.—21st, 56 fr.—23d, 57 fr.—24th, 55 fr. 90.—25th, 55 fr.—26th, 54 fr. 40.

BR. NAVY, 1st APRIL.	Line.	50's	Frig.	Sps.	Tot.
In Port and fitting, and with sealed orders	25	3	20	49	97
English and Irish Channels	6	0	21	10	31
Downs and North Sea	1	2	15	16	34
West-Indies and Passage	2	0	6	21	29
Jamaica station	10	0	6	8	24
America and Newfoundland	0	1	3	4	8
Cape of G. Hope, East-Indies,	5	6	9	15	35
Coast of Africa	0	0	1	1	2
Portugal and Gibraltar	0	0	1	2	3
Mediterranean and on Passage	11	2	21	12	46
Hospital and Prison Ships	1	0	0	0	1
Total in Commission	55	14	103	138	310
Receiving Ships	5	1	8	1	15
Serviceable and repairing	29	4	17	4	54
In Ordinary	83	5	77	66	231
Building	24	1	12	9	46
Total	196	25	217	218	656
ORDINARY.					
Portsmouth	37	2	24	13	76
Plymouth	39	1	21	23	84
Chatham	38	6	20	3	67
Sheerness	1	1	8	7	17
River	2	0	29	25	56
Total	117	10	102	71	300

PRICE OF STOCKS.—MARCH.

Day of Month	Omnium	5 per Ct. 1797.	5 pr. Ct. Ann.	4 pr. C. Con.	3 per C. Con.	3 pr. C. R. An.	Bank Stock
11	14 di	—	96⅝	—	63⅞	—	182
12	15	—	96½	—	63¾	—	180
14	14½	—	97	—	63	—	—
15	14¼	—	96¾	—	62⅞	—	—
16	14½	—	98	—	65⅜	—	178
17	12½	—	90¼	—	65½	—	—
18	13½	—	99	—	65⅜	—	178
19	13	—	100	—	65½	—	181
21	11½	—	99⅝	—	65½	—	—
22	12⅜	—	99½	—	64¾	—	—
23	12¾	—	99½	—	64½	—	—
24	12¼	—	99	—	64⅜	—	—
25	12½	—	—	—	64¾	—	—
26	13¼	—	98¼	—	64⅜	—	—
28	11¼	—	99⅛	—	66	—	—
29	13½	—	98⅝	—	62	—	177
30	15½	—	96¾	—	61¼	—	—
31	16	—	97½	—	61	—	177

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

☞ As several articles which have been left for the purpose of insertion in our Register, but which we have not deemed suitable for publication, have afterwards been sent for; we beg it to be generally understood by our Correspondents, that all anonymous articles of the above description will, henceforth, be immediately committed to the flames, unless directions, specifying where they are to be returned are sent with them.

ERRATUM.—Page 391, line 8, for *and mock* read *and not mock*.

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